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The Indian Railways (IR) have grand plans. They would like to leapfrog to a higher growth trajectory during 
2010-20. Towards this, they would like to see a total investment of Rs 14,00,000 crores (cr), as stated in the 
Vision 2020, brought out by the Ministry of Railways (MoR) in December 2009. With whatever level of 
optimistic projections for the internal resources and borrowings for the coming decade, clearly, PPPs would have 
to be a significant source. This makes it imperative for the IR to create a policy framework that would attract 
PPPs, especially in the context that the PPPs in IR have not taken off as projected.  
 
This paper reviews PPP projects that the IR has evolved over the past 25 years. These include operating 
partnership  projects  of  IR  including  with  the  state  government,  PPPs  in  the  pipeline,  and  discontinued 
partnership projects in IR.  
 
The  paper  brings  out  issues  that  have  implications  for  PPPs  in  IR.  The  significant  ones  are  focus  on 
infrastructure creation PPPs rather than service PPPs, partner selection more contextually based than through 
open competitive bidding, more than acceptable time lags between conceptualization and project execution, issues 
in extending the project scope, non mutuality in contractual arrangements, and conflict of interest due to 
multiple roles of IR.  
 
Based on these issues, the paper derives certain key lessons and provides a way forward. 
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Lessons from PPPs of Indian Railways and Way Forward 
 
 
Financing Indian Railways 
 
1.  The Indian Railways (IR) have grand plans. They would like to leapfrog to a higher 
growth trajectory during 2010-20. Towards this, they would like to see a total investment 
of Rs 14,00,000 crores (cr), as stated in the Vision 2020, brought out by the Ministry of 
Railways (MoR) in December 2009 [MoR, 2009 (a) Exhibit 1]. Though it is not explicitly 
stated in the document, we assume that this is based on current prices, which is how all the 
IR figures are presented and even added.  
 
The budgeted investments have just reached Rs 41,000 cr for 2010-11. Under a practical 
scenario (A), assuming (i) a quadrupling over the 10 year period (like it happened in the 
previous decade), and (ii) a linear increase to Rs 164,000 cr in 2019-20 would amount to 
a total investment of about Rs 10,00,000 cr at current prices. Under the envisioned scenario 
(B), to achieve a total investment of Rs 14,00,000 cr, the investment in the terminal year 
should reach nearly Rs 2,40,000 cr, ie a six fold increase This would imply an average 
annual increase in investment of at least Rs 22,000 cr. The total investments in scenarios A and 
B at the 2006-07 prices, assuming a 5% annual inflation rate, would be Rs 6,50,000 cr and Rs 
8,75,000 cr respectively. 
 
2.  This number has to be viewed in the context of the projections made by the Planning 
Commission (PC) for the infrastructure sector during the XII Plan (2012-17), which is 
Rs 41,00,000 cr at 2006-07 prices [PC, 2010]. Assuming that we can double this for the 10 
year  period  (2010-20),  the  total  infrastructure  investment  would  be  Rs  82,00,000  cr. 
Based on the actuals of the X Plan (2002-07) and the revised estimates for the XI Plan 
(2007-12),  the  investment  for  the  head  ‘Railways  (incl  MRTS)’  as  a  share  of  total 
infrastructure investment has been at around 10%. Considering a marginal step up in the 
share, while at the same time excluding the Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) outside 
the IR, the IR investments could continue to remain at a net of 10%. This would be Rs 
8,20,000 cr at 2006-07 prices during 2010-20.  
 
It appears that the scenario of the Vision 2020 document is achievable, provided the 
financing  is  as  envisioned  to  include  internal  resources,  budgetary  support,  and  
borrowings and Public Private Partnerships (PPP). 
 
 
PPPs: An Imperative for IR 
 
3.  The  MoR  expects  a  budgetary  support  of  Rs  5,00,000  cr  towards  the  total  decadal 
investment of Rs 14,00,000 cr. Of the remaining Rs 9,00,000 cr, it remains to be seen 
how much will be through internal resources, ‘prudent’ borrowings and PPPs. The X 
Plan  actuals  had  a  total  investment  of  Rs  85,000  cr,  of  which  budgetary  support 
contributed Rs 38,000 cr, and internal resources contributed Rs 30,000 cr (Exhibit 1). Of 
the remaining Rs 17,000 cr, nearly Rs 16,700 cr had come in through market borrowings 
through the Indian Railways Finance Corporation (IRFC) and the balance Rs 300 cr  
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through PPPs [MoR, 2008]. With whatever level of optimistic projections for the internal resources 
and borrowings for the coming decade, clearly, PPPs would have to be a significant source. This makes it 
imperative for the IR to create a policy framework that would attract PPPs.  
 
4.  The Vision 2020 document said the following on PPPs: 
 
“To achieve the mammoth task Railway has set itself, it has to concentrate on its core activity of 
creation of railway infrastructure and operations and forge partnerships with private sector to do the 
rest. The challenge of project execution and efficient provision of service can not be accomplished 
without involving private sector in a big way. However, the activities and projects to be opened for 
private participation have to be carefully selected and structured for their amenability to market-based 
incentives and smooth execution. Several areas currently identified for execution through PPP such as 
redevelopment/development of world-class stations, high-speed corridors, setting up of Multi-modal 
Logistics  Parks,  Kisan  Vision  projects,  expansion  and  management  of  the  extensive  network  of 
Optical Fibre Cables (OFCs) and big infrastructure projects like new lines and Dedicated Freight 
Corridors,  rolling-stock  manufacturing  units,  Multi-functional  Complexes  at  stations  and  port 
connectivity projects would need to be developed and awarded on a mission mode. To be able to do 
so,  Railways  would  have  set  up  dedicated  project  organizations  who  would  work  with  model 
documents and streamlined procedure within the framework determined by Government of India.” 
 
5.  The justification for this comes primarily from the resource mobilization argument. To 
quote the Vision 2020 document,  
 
“A high-growth strategy would require massive investments in capacity creation, network expansion 
and upgradation. Annexure-II (of the Vision document) shows a list of capacity enhancement and 
railway modernization works and a very rough assessment of the investment programme needed to 
support the achievement of the goals of the Vision. Tentatively, it has been estimated that around Rs 
14,00,000 cr over the next 10 years (ie up to the year 2020). Of this, most of the investment for world-
class stations and high speed corridors could be mobilized through Public-Private Partnerships. A 
sizeable part of the investment required for port connectivity projects, setting up of electric/diesel 
locomotive manufacturing units and new coach manufacturing units could also be mobilized through 
private sector participation by SPV or Joint Venture (JV) route. Metropolitan Transport Projects and 
some of the new line projects could be taken up with partnerships with the state governments. Public 
Private Partnerships could also be used in setting up  of private freight terminals, logistics parks, 
wagon investment schemes and licensing of freight service operators who would bring in specialized 
rolling stock and new terminals. Railways can also borrow within prudent limits through IRFC.” 
 
6.  While the resource mobilization argument for PPPs is important, it is equally important 
to  keep  in  view  the  customer  oriented  value  that  PPPs  can  bring  in,  due  to  their 
entrepreneurial and managerial energy. This is best demonstrated in the Indian telecom 
sector, whose recent phenomenal growth has been driven by the private sector under a 
PPP framework. Given the slow growth rates until the 90’s with long waiting lines for 
connections, the sector was opened up with new policy frameworks in 1999. The target 
overall teledensity that was envisaged then for December 31, 2010 was 15%, with rural 
teledensity at 4%. The achievements have far outstripped the targets. As of January 31, 
2010, the overall teledensity was 49.5%, with rural teledensity at 21.2% [DoT, 2010]. 
India is the fastest growing telecom sector in the world, and the second largest wireless 
telecom network after China. To top all this, the Indian telecom sector offers the lowest 
tariff in the world. India is set to become a global telecom manufacturing hub. Indian 
service providers have started moving into global markets.   
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All this in the telecom sector can be attributed to a proactive PPP policy that shifted the focus from 
delivery in the government domain to the private domain with competition, and a clear unbundling of 
roles of licensing, regulation, and operations. 
 
PPPs in IR: Yet to Take Off 
 
7.  The PC has estimated the public and private investments across all infrastructure sectors 
for the X and XI Plan (Exhibit 2). For the head ‘Railways (incl MRTS)’, out of the actual 
total investments of Rs 102,091 cr in the X Plan, public investment was estimated at 
101,422 cr and private investment at Rs 669 cr. It has to be noted that the borrowings 
from the IRFC of nearly Rs 16,700 cr is included under public investment. Of the Rs 
669 cr private investment, the PPP component for IR is about Rs 300 cr, as already 
stated in para 3 of this document, and the balance is from the MRTS.  
 
8.  For the XI Plan, original projections for the total infrastructure sector had estimated the 
private investment share to be about 30%. As a part of the mid-term appraisal, the PC 
has estimated the investment in the first two years of the plan ie 2007-08 and 2008-09 
and revised the projections for the entire plan period. As per the revised projections, 
private investment share in infrastructure has increased to 36%. This has been a result of 
increased private participation in the significant sectors of electricity and telecom. In the 
case of ‘Railways (incl MRTS)’, however, the projections show a different trend. As per 
the  original  estimates,  the  private  investment  share  was  about  19%.  The  revised 
projections indicate only 4% investments coming from the private sector. This is a sharp 
decrease from the original 19% estimate. While PPPs in the MRTS sector have not lived 
up to their expectations, the more significant implication is that the PPPs in IR have not taken off 
as projected.  
 
PPPs in IR: A Brief History 
 
9.  Historically,  since  1853,  railways  in  India  developed  through  private  enterprise. 
However, there was a PPP element to them with government providing free land and a 
guaranteed rate of interest between 4.5 to 5.0% [Jain, 2007]. Over the years, driven by 
the  importance  of  railways  to  the  colonial  administration,  the  stakeholding  of  the 
government went up in terms of ‘ownership,’ oversight of contractual elements, reduced 
interest guarantee, and increased revenue share. A large number of PPP models came 
into play. In 1921, the Acworth Committee recommended that the state should take 
direct responsibility of development and management of railway system. Consequent to 
this, but for a few railway lines, all the private railway systems were ‘nationalized,’ as and 
when  the  contracts  expired.  This  was  the  government  run  railway  system  that  we 
inherited on Independence, after which, in the 1950s, there was reorganization into eight 
large zones for operational reasons. With a couple of subsequent reorganizations, the IR 
today  constitutes  16  railway  zones,  seven  independent  manufacturing  units,  five 
associated units and 13 corporations.  
 
10. Since  Independence,  all  railway  projects,  manufacturing  and  operations  were  solely 
developed and managed by the MoR through internal resources and budgetary support. 
Private parties were involved significantly in construction, wagon manufacturing, stores  
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and component supplies, and catering, through a tendering process. Freight end users 
could have their own sidings for captive use, and engage handling contractors for loading 
and unloading even at railway terminals. An insignificant number of private railway lines 
and ‘out agents’ at certain important towns outside the railway network continued, but in 
a reducing manner. 
 
11. The first involvement in a project from outside the IR happened when, in 1986, City 
Industrial and Development Corporation (CIDCO) of the Maharashtra Government got 
involved  in  contributing financially  (two  third  of the  project  cost)  for  providing  rail 
connectivity to Navi Mumbai. CIDCO had the right of commercialization of non railway 
operating  parts  of  the  station  area  and  the  air  space,  and  had  to  bear  the  relevant 
maintenance cost. A surcharge of Rs 1 was per ticket was levied for additional revenue to 
CIDCO (Exhibit 3). This was an example of a public-public partnership. 
 
12. Following this, the Konkan Railway Corporation (KRC) was formed as a joint venture 
(JV) company between MoR and the state governments of Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka 
and Kerala, to Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) a 738 kms coastal rail connectivity 
project between south of Mumbai and Mangalore. The project was completed at a cost 
of  Rs  3,375  cr,  of  which,  Rs  800  cr  was  the  equity.  While  KRC  established  new 
benchmarks  for  operational  efficiency,  it  accrued  significant  accumulated  losses, 
primarily due to interest costs. In 2008, the MoR helped KRC restructure a lot of its debt 
as equity, thereby reducing the interest costs. It also removed the 10 year ‘Transfer’ 
clause, making KRC a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) from a BOT. 
 
13. These projects gave a kick start to state government involvement in rail connectivity 
projects. Within such projects, port connectivity attracted the involvement of ports and 
neighbouring major industry.  
 
14. As seen from Exhibit 1, the historical total of investments in IR upto March 31, 2010 
has been Rs 3,08,000 cr, of which internal resources contributed 41%, budgetary support 
38%, and the remaining 21% had come in through market borrowings (The absolute 
number is not meaningful since it is an addition of amount invested over various years. 
The  investment  share  from  different  sources  is  a  little  more  meaningful).  The  PPP 
source under market borrowings has contributed very little to date. 
 
PPP Focus: Infrastructure Creation vs Service 
 
15. A summarised review of 24 (nearly exhaustive) PPP projects that the IR has evolved 
over the years until recently is provided in Exhibit 3. 10 PPPs in the pipeline are briefly 
described in Exhibit 4. An overall perspective indicates that IR is more comfortable with 
infrastructure  creation  PPPs  rather  than  service  PPPs.  This  is  reflected  in  the  larger 
number  of  and  more  financially  significant  rail  connectivity,  wagon  procurement, 
locomotive manufacturing, world class railway stations, multimodal logistics parks and 
high speed corridor projects. Out of the 24 PPPs described in Exhibit 3, only six focus 
on  service  PPPs.  Apart  from  the  traditional  catering  (and  more  recently  train  and 
reservation enquiry, and (limited) train booking), the service PPPs have extended into  
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luxury tourist trains, cleaning of coaches at major stations and depots, parcel, and more 
significantly container trains.  
 
16. Going by the international experience and the phasing in other sectors (airlines being 
privatized before airports PPPs, road based services being traditionally in the private 
domain before road BOT PPPs), one would believe that services would first get the PPP 
framework before the infrastructure creation getting it. The explicit argument used by 
the IR is that, given the complexity of rail operations and potential for better resource 
utilization, the comparative advantage in managing services would be with IR.  
 
17. This  argument  is  limited  since  services  have  many  levels.  At  the  simplest,  we  can 
categorise  it  into  three:  maintenance,  operations  and  customer  services  [Raghuram, 
2001]. Operations are closest to the infrastructure like train haulage, train control etc. 
The benefits of dealing with complexity and better resource utilization would be limited 
to  this  area,  if  at  all.  The  customer  services  which  deal  with  value  added  customer 
interfacing and maintenance like input services are workable in the PPP space. In fact, 
the customer responsiveness and market savviness that the PPPs bring in for customer 
services can increase revenues far beyond what a large system like IR can do. Similarly, a 
competitive procurement can bring down the costs of maintenance, and improve quality. 
 
18. Our  diagnosis  of  the  situation  is  that  the  IR  is  comfortable  with  some  of  the 
infrastructure creation moving into PPP space since they have been used to it with the 
traditional  outsourcing  by  using  contractors  for  construction,  and  public  and  private 
manufacturers for wagon procurement. On the other hand, there is a tremendous sense 
of  discomfort  of  customer  interfacing  services  moving  into  PPP  space,  since  they 
involve  revenue  generation  and  control  on  end  user  pricing.  Regarding  maintenance 
services moving into PPP space, the discomfort is due to the need for specifying and 
overseeing  the  critical  elements  of  such  input  services,  especially  from  the  safety 
perspective.  
 
PPP Projects: Issues and Lessons 
 
19. The  partner  selection  for  many  of  the  PPPs  including  the  rail  connectivity  projects  has  been  more 
contextually (strategically?) based than through open competitive bidding. There are pros and cons in 
this.  While  a  ‘strategic’  partner  is  expected  to  bring  in  more  than  just  financial 
stakeholding (like ports and user industries in the case of port connectivity projects, 
tourism development corporations in case of luxury trains), they may not be interested in 
developing a professional expertise in rail based SPVs. Their experience then gets limited 
to the specific SPV, and further may not offer the best value for money. The example of 
the  Deccan  Odyssey,  where  the  strategic  partner  was  Maharashtra  State  Tourism 
Development Corporation (MSTDC), did not do as well as when Thomas Cook came 
into the picture as a subcontractor to the MSTDC, and even changing the itinerary to a 
more  acceptable  one  for  attracting  clientele.  Also,  ‘strategic’  partners  may  never  be 
comfortable  with  contracts  and  seek  favourable  amendments,  since  there  was  no 
competitive element in studying the contractual implications and the risks thereof. The 
Pipavav Railway Corporation Limited (PRCL) is a case in point (Exhibit 5).  
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Since many of the PPPs affected by our hypothesis are young, only time will tell whether 
the  approach  has  been  okay.  However,  the  evidence  in  other  sectors  like  road  very 
clearly points to using the open competitive bidding route rather than working with 
strategic partners.  
 
20. PPP  projects  have  suffered  from  delays,  with  more  than  acceptable  time  lags  between 
conceptualization and project execution. The most important reason for such delays has been in 
evolving  workable  Request  for  Quotation  (RFQ),  Request  for  Proposal  (RFP)  and 
contractual agreements, and in taking along a variety of stakeholders, driven by changing 
stances  of  the  MoR.  Examples  of  this  are  the  world  class  station  at  New  Delhi, 
locomotive  factories  at  Madhepura  and  Marhowra  in  Bihar.  Exhibit  4  gives  a  brief 
description of these PPPs and others, which are in the pipeline. In the case of New 
Delhi  railway  station,  the  bid  was  scrapped  twice,  first  due  to  the  issue  of  cross 
ownership among bidders and the second time due to denial of permissions from other 
stakeholders  including  New  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation,  Municipal  Corporation  of 
Delhi, Delhi Development Authority and Delhi Traffic police. 
 
21. The changing stances is also reflected in some of the discontinued partnership concepts in 
IR  (Exhibit  6)  like  wagon  procurement  related  PPPs  (Own  Your  Wagon  Scheme 
(OYWS),    Wagon  Investment  Scheme  (WIS)),  construction  related  PPPs,  and  Build 
Own Lease Transfer (BOLT) scheme. Exhibit 7 provides a comparison of the wagon 
related PPPs including the OYWS, WIS, and the more recently launched (and currently 
valid)  Liberalized  Wagon  Investment  Scheme  (LWIS),  and  Wagon  Leasing  Scheme 
(WLS). (Exhibit 3 gives a brief overview of the LWIS and WLS). The comparison brings 
out  the  varying  stance  of  IR  on  issues  such  as  whether  (i)  the  wagon  additionality 
through PPPs should be for the standard workhorse type wagons or technology break 
through wagons including for special purpose and high capacity, and (ii) the benefits 
should  be  lease  charges,  freight  concession  and/or  service  guarantees.  The  positive 
perspective is that the IR is willing to be flexible in modifying the schemes, as it learns 
from the (lack of) response to each one of them. This ofcourse is based on the premise 
that each scheme is being evolved with due stakeholder consultation and homework 
driven by a strategic perspective. 
 
22. The PPP experience has been that the transactions with the IR have not always been smooth. 
The  most  telling  example  here  is  the  container  train  operations,  where  incumbent 
resistance,  entry  and  growth  barriers  and  non  level  playing  field  have  consistently 
affected the players (Exhibit 8). The issues are often at a level where the very intent of 
the MoR is in question as to whether they really want PPPs in this domain.  
 
23. This is also illustrated in denial and delays in extending the project scope which could provide 
great  value  to  the  end  user  and  the  SPV.  This  is  based  on  the  perspective  that  the 
significant returns which would accrue to the private player might as well directly accrue 
to IR, thus defeating the very purpose of the PPP. Examples are extending the scope of 
gauge conversion to the Kutch Railway Corporation Limited (KRCL), which was at first 
conceptually accepted, but later on retracted as a project that Rail Vikas Nigam Limited 
(RVNL) could do on its own. We quote from a case study on KRCL [IIMB, 2010]: 
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“On basis of its good performance in executing Kutch link project, having successfully restricted cost 
and time overruns, KRCL was being approached by private bodies as well as Railways for partnering 
in  broad-gauge  conversion  projects  in  other  parts  of  the  country.  Specifically,  KRCL  was  being 
considered for executing:  
 
•  223-km broad gauge line project between Bhiladi and Samadari 
•  Conversion of a 100-km rail link between Bhuj and Naliya from narrow gauge to broad gauge – 
approached by Sanghi Cement 
•  Broad gauge conversion of 100 km link between Bhildi and Mehsana 
 
However, none of these projects were eventually done by KRC; they were executed by IR on its own. 
The rationale for this seems to be that IR does not want to share revenues with SPVs for lines that 
have potentially good traffic/business.  
 
As remarked by the ex-CMD, KRCL, “Railways backtracked on their policy and suggested that those 
lines that make good business should not be given to SPVs for conversion, because it amounts to 
sharing of revenues.”  
 
Similarly, long length sidings or branch lines off the KRC which can yield high returns 
have been put on hold since the IR has yet to come to terms with its implications on 
other PPPs. In the meantime, the potential end users in the region of the KRC alignment 
are losing out, since they do not have access to rail connectivity, and have to resort to 
avoidable  road  movement.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  KRC  is  a  public  public 
partnership.  
 
The  lack  of  responsive  and  flexible  approach  to  project  scoping  is  affecting  the 
stakeholders.  
 
24. One domain in which there has been increased activity in the recent years is luxury 
tourist trains (Exhibit 3). A new policy was announced by the MoR in 2008, as given in 
Exhibit 10. While the idea of renewed interest is welcome, the policy statement comes through 
as being a one sided government circular rather than for a commercial partnership that we wish to 
nurture.  
 
The IR specifies that all maintenance and terminal activities will be undertaken by them 
rather than give the option of alternate ways of doing this. The charges for this would be 
determined by the IR. There is a revenue share provision based on train occupancy 
which  is  in  discrete  intervals.  This  could  create  incentives  for  misrepresentation, 
especially at the limits of each interval. It could very well have been made a continuous 
revenue share (say 10%) as a proportion of the occupancy. Similarly, haulage charges (a 
significant portion of the costs) would be determined by IR and payment due in advance. 
Records would have to be maintained appropriately for verification by IR, though there 
is no  mention of what records and service levels IR would adhere to. Some of the 
difficulties due to this policy are elaborated in Exhibit 3 under luxury tourist trains. 
 
On similar lines, the new policies for the LWIS and WLS state that dispute resolution 
will be through an arbitrator to be set up by the General Manager of the concerned zonal 
railway (Exhibit 7). This is a clear conflict of interest, since IR is one of the parties in the 
contract. 
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PPPs: Way Forward 
 
25. Partly in response to administrative delays and the need to develop an expertise based 
professional approach, the IR has setup umbrella SPVs for PPPs in specific domains 
and/or geographical regions (Exhibit 9). For example, Container Corporation of India 
Ltd (CONCOR), which was originally setup to promote rail based container traffic, has 
in  the  recent  years  developed  JVs  and  gotten  into  port  based  container  terminal 
management, cold storage etc. The Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation 
Ltd (IRCTC) has licensed other organizations for a variety of reservation, enquiry and 
tourism  related  services.  Rail  Infrastructure  Development  Company  of  Karnataka 
(KRIDE) and RVNL were created for rail connectivity projects. They brought in the 
administrative platform of one time approvals from the ministry on certain dimensions 
and thus eliminated the need to go back for approvals for each project. The Rail Land 
Development  Authority  (RLDA)  can  enable  SPVs  to  commercially  develop  vacant 
railway land. They are also expected to facilitate PPPs for world class stations and multi 
modal logistics parks (MMLP).  
 
It would be too early to comment on the performance of this structure of umbrella 
SPVs. It would be fair to say that many projects have been conceptualized as PPPs 
because of these SPVs. However, there have been delays in project execution, many of 
the causes of which are currently outside the specific control of these SPVs. As a way 
forward, it would help review the performance of the umbrella SPVs. 
 
26. The most important dimension that needs to be addressed for a smooth way forward is 
to have a shared vision as to why IR need PPPs. The logic for this should be more than 
just resource mobilization. It needs to focus on the complementing need of entrepreneurial and 
managerial energies that private parties can bring in to make rail based transport value adding 
for the end user. Once this is clear, then the attributes of the commercialization that is 
required for PPPs to succeed would fall into place. Exhibit 11 provides some of these 
attributes, based on earlier work by the author. These include, for each PPP, equity 
leverage,  goal  clarity,  risk  sharing,  decision  making  autonomy,  partner’s  interest  (and 
competence),  project  structuring  quality,  transaction  costs,  and  transparency  for 
contestability.  
 
Along the same lines, the private partners cannot be viewed as ‘agents’ but as ‘dynamic 
organizations’ who would like to grow. This is precisely what IR should want from the 
PPPs (including the public public partnerships) to make this a success.  
 
27. To minimize the scope of misinterpretation, there is a need to develop well written contracts 
that act as a precise policy and regulatory framework between the IR and private parties. 
Three such model documents for container train operation, redevelopment of railway 
station, and procurement-cum-maintenance of locomotives have been prepared in the 
recent past by the PC. Also, the contracts should be ready well before making any legal 
commitment  with  private  parties.  In  the  case  of  container  trains  operations,  the 
concession agreement was ready only after one year of awarding the licence. 
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28. On a purely legal context, it is useful to question whether the Indian Railways Act 1989 and the 
Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR) 1991 are a limitation? Relevant excerpts from the IR Act are 
provided in Exhibit 12. The net takeaway is that it is not. Some have quoted that the IPR 
1991 is a limitation [Jain 2007] (Exhibit 13). However, it would appear that in today’s 
context, this document ought not to really carry a constraining influence, and even if it 
did, it should be modifiable. Prior to the liberalization in 1991, the IPR statements were 
very critical and hence were modified every few years as per government policy. After 
1991, the IPR has not been modified. 
 
29. Given  the  current  internal  structure  and  orientation  (strong  cadre  culture,  hierarchy 
orientation and top management structure) of the IR, it would be very daunting for 
private players to develop PPPs with the MoR. Apart from the specter of dealing with a 
large ‘machinery’ like IR, the popular perception is that there are issues of one sided 
contracts, interpretations of unclear implications going in favor of the railways and the 
conflict of interest due to IR playing the role of licensor, operator and regulator. 
 
On a positive note, there has been reinforcement at the political level on the issue of 
PPPs. However, the IR would need to develop a more flexible approach based on not just a 
political language of PPP, but creating an organization that listens to, learns from and is responsive 
to a variety of stakeholders including customers, other affected and involved entities, and partners in 
PPPs.  
 
30. A  good  start  is  in  top  management  restructuring.  The  Vision  2020  document  states  the 
following on organizational restructuring: 
 
“Organizational  restructuring  is,  of  course,  fraught  with  challenges  of  its  own  and  needs  to  be 
carefully  attempted.  One  possible  approach  to  address  this  issue  could  be  to  reconfigure  the 
organization by separating infrastructure from operations and reorganization on business lines i.e. 
passenger, freight and parcel and other auxiliary services so that each service could be managed and 
measured on a profit-centre basis. Areas, other than core operations, where appropriate, could be 
corporatised to impart business focus and managerial autonomy for such tasks.” 
 
While one would agree with this, it is important to begin immediately with a separation in the 
IR’s roles of licensor, operator and regulator. The separation of infrastructure and operations 
can then follow.  
 
In parallel with this, what anyway is proposed eventually, the Railway Board Members’ roles 
should be redefined towards strategizing for key market segments rather than as the current cadre 
based  functional  supremo.  Corporatization  (for  business  focus  and  managerial 
autonomy) need not be limited to non core operations. In fact, the very essence of PPPs 
(corporatized  through  SPVs)  in  core  activities  is  to  bring  in  the  business  focus  and 
managerial autonomy.  
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Exhibit 1: Financing of IR 
 
Rs cr 








March 31, 2010 
2010-11 
(BE) 







•  IRFC 
•  PPP  
•  RVNL 
•  WIS/LWIS/WLS 











•  DRF, DF & OLWR 
•  Capital fund 
29,539  14,948  18,941  12,285 
8,906 
3,379 
127,088  14,523  90,000 
9,00,000 
Gross Budgetary Support 
•  Budgetary Support 
•  Additional Budgetary     
  Support for National   
  Projects 
•  Railway Safety Fund 
•  Diesel Cess 













63,635  5,00,000 
 
Total   84,708  28,980  36,336  40,285  308,314  41,426  233,289  14,00,000 
*Rs 1,031cr includes PPP, RVNL and LWIS/WLS. 
#Rs 15,875 cr includes budgetary support, additional budgetary support and railway safety fund 
 
BE: Budget Estimates; RE: Revised Estimates; DRF: Depreciation Reserve Fund; DF: Development Fund; OLWR: Open Line Works - Revenue 
 
[MoR, 2008; MoR, 2009a] 
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Exhibit 2: Infrastructure Sectorwise Investments 
 




XI Plan  
(Revised Projections) 
  Rs cr  %  Rs cr  %  Rs cr  % 
 
Electricity (incl NCE)  340,237    666,525    658,630   
Public  203,403  59.78  481,013  72.17  371,085  56.34 
Private  136,834  40.22  185,512  27.83  287,546  43.66 
 
Telecom  101,889    258,439    345,134   
Public  48,213  47.32  80,753  31.25  61,503  17.82 
Private  53,676  52.68  177,686  68.75  283,631  82.18 
 
Roads and Bridges  127,107    314,152    278,658   
Public  117,884  92.74  207,360  66.01  232,771  83.53 
Private  9,223  7.26  106,792  33.99  45,887  16.47 
 
Railways (incl MRTS)  102,091    261,808    200,802   
Public  101,422  99.34  211,454  80.77  192,486  95.86 
Private  669  0.66  50,354  19.23  8,316  4.14 
 
Irrigation, Water Supply and 
Sanitation  166,851    397,031    136,323   
Public  165,833  99.39  391,610  98.63  135,839  99.64 
Private  1,018  0.61  5,421  1.37  484  0.36 
 
Oil and Gas Pipelines  32,367    16,855    127,306   
Public  31,367  96.91  10,327  61.27  74,545  58.56 
Private  1,000  3.09  6,528  38.73  52,761  41.44 
 
Ports  22,997    87,995    40,647   
Public  4,670  20.31  33,516  38.09  8,130  20.00 
Private  18,327  79.69  54,479  61.91  32,517  80.00 
 
Airports  6,893    30,968    36,138   
Public  4,523  65.62  9,338  30.15  12,983  35.93 
Private  2,370  34.38  21,630  69.85  23,155  64.07 
 
Storage  5,643    22,378    8,966   
Public  3,539  62.71  11,189  50.00  351  3.91 
Private  2104  37.29  11,189  50.00  8,615  96.09 
 
Total Infrastructure  906,074    2,056,150    2,054,205   
Public  680,854  75.14  1,436,559  69.87  1,311,293  63.83 
Private  225,220  24.86  619,591  30.13  742,912  36.17 
[PC, 2010]  
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Exhibit 3: Partnership Projects of IR 
 
1.  CIDCO IR (1986)  
[Jain, 2008a; http://www.indianexpress.com/news/no-metro-in-navi-mumbai-cr-to-continue-with/516999/] 
 
·  Partnership between  IR  and  the  City  and  Industrial Development  Corporation (CIDCO)  in 
Mumbai for providing rail connectivity to Navi Mumbai in August 1986. 
·  Cost of construction of the railway line, station building, operational and commercial area was 
shared in 2:1 ratio between CIDCO and IR. Ownership of the line and land remained with IR. 
·  CIDCO had the right to commercialize the air space and other parts of the station area. During 
operation, non-operational maintenance costs were to be borne by CIDCO. 
·  IR levied a surcharge of Rs 1 per ticket for the journeys touching any part of the rail network so 
developed. Money so collected was transferred to CIDCO. 
·  Rolling stock was provided by the Central Railway. 
·  O&M responsibilities were fulfilled by the Central Railway. 
·  Operational losses were to be borne by the Central Railway 
·  The Mankhurd to Belapur new line (27 kms) was built using this model for the first time in 1993. 
·  CIDCO and IR (Central Railways) had got approval for a second partnership project of Rs 494 
cr,  a  suburban  railway  line  from  Belapur-Seawoods-Uran  in  Mumbai,  in  1996.  CIDCO  was 
supposed  to  pay  Rs  331  cr  and  Central  Railway  Rs  163  cr.  The  project  got  stalled  on 
environmental grounds and the matter was pending in the High Court. The project got the 
necessary approvals in 2008. The project cost has gone up to Rs 1480 cr due to delays. 
 
2.  Konkan Railway Corporation Limited (KRC) (1990)  
[Raghuram, 2002; http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page1.asp?relid=61760] 
 
·  The first joint venture company of IR formed in public-public partnership, where IR and four 
state governments are partners. 
·  To construct a new 738 km coastal railway line for bridging the Konkan Gap by providing 
railway connection between Roha (150 kms south of Mumbai) and Thokur (about 22 kms north 
of Mangalore). 
·  KRC was structured as a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project, with a concession period of 10 
years from start of operations.  
·  Estimated project cost was Rs 1400 cr, debt equity ratio was 2.5:1 with 51% equity from MoR.  
·  The project was completed at a cost of Rs 3,375 cr (Rs 2,425 cr of investment and Rs 950 cr as 
capitalized interest) and commenced operations since 26 January 1998.  
·  Out  of Rs  3,375  cr,  Rs  800  cr  was  equity  capital.  Equity  was shared  between MoR  (51%), 
Government  of  Maharashtra  (22%), Government  of Karnataka  (15%),  Government  of  Goa 
(6%), and Government of Kerala (6%). 
·  The only organisation outside IR which owns, operates and maintains its own assets. 
·  The operating and maintenance expenses were in excess of Rs one cr per day. KRC’s financial 
situation deteriorated as the earlier projections of business growth did not materialize. 
·  Inspite of establishing new benchmarks for operational efficiency, the KRC had accumulated 
losses of Rs 2353 cr till 2003-04, primarily due to interest costs. 
·  In 2008, the MoR helped KRC restructure a lot of its debt as equity, thereby reducing the 
interest costs. It also removed the 10 year ‘Transfer’ clause, making KRC a BOO from a BOT.  
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·  In 2009-10, the net loss of KRC was brought down to Rs 10 cr from Rs 79 cr in 2008-09. During 
the same period, the total earnings were Rs 742 cr and the operating surplus was Rs 224 cr. The 
operating ratio improved to 77.8 % during 2009-10 as compared to 83.8 % in 2008-09.  
·  A proposal is being prepared for a bypass line connecting Verna with Cansaulim to allow empty 
rakes to come directly to the port. 
 
3.  Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation Limited (MRVC) (1999) 
[http://203.176.113.182/MRVC/intr.html; IIP, 2009] 
 
·  MRVC, a joint venture SPV with MoR (51%) and Government of Maharashtra (49%), was 
incorporated on July 12, 1999, to implement the Railway work of Mumbai Urban Transport 
Project (MUTP).  The Corporation will execute the projects so far identified and will also be 
involved in the planning and development of Mumbai Suburban Rail system. 
·  The requirement of funds for the total project including resettlement and rehabilitation will be 
provided as follows: 
￿  Budgetary support from Government of Maharashtra and IR.  
￿  Revenue from commercial development of Railway land airspace.  
￿  Borrowings to be decided with mutual consent of Government of Maharashtra and IR.  
￿  Surcharge  to  be  levied  on  commuters  from  a  date  to  be  mutually  agreed  upon  between 
Government of Maharashtra and IR.  
·  Phase I of the MUTP, costing Rs 3125 cr, is funded through debt equity ratio of 1:1. Debt 
component is being provided by the World Bank. Construction is done by the Western and 
Central zonal railways, which are also the operators of the services. The ongoing works under 
phase 1 are expected to be completed by December 2010. 
·  Phase II of MUTP, costing Rs 4509 cr, was approved in February 2003. Four projects are being 
identified. The work is likely to be completed by June 2014. 
·  In 2008-09, total turnover of MRVC stood at Rs 36 cr, a growth of 10.4% over the previous 
year. The net profit fell down by 22.0% from previous fiscal (23 cr), to Rs 17.6 cr. 
·  MRVC has prepared a concept note for the Phase III of the MUTP. MRVC proposes to add 
corridors to the already existing ones and also increase the length of local trains from 12 coaches, 
to 15-18 coaches. The proposals for the third phase of MUTP are in the preliminary stages. 
 
4.  Pipavav Railway Corporation Limited (PRCL) (2000)  
[Raghuram at el, 2010] 
 
·  First joint venture project on Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) basis. MoU signed on 20th 
January, 2000 
·  Conversion of 250 km from MG to BG from Surendranagar to Rajula City and construction of 
14 km rail line to provide BG connectivity to Pipavav port. 
·  Estimated project cost was Rs 270 cr, with debt to equity ratio being 1:2.  
·  The project was completed at a cost of Rs 373 cr (Rs 173 cr debt and Rs 200 cr equity). Equity 
was shared between MoR (50%) and Gujarat Pipavav Port Ltd (GPPL) (50%).   
·  Concession was granted for 33 years. EPC contractor: WR., O&M contractor: WR 
·  The demand risk and the project construction risk were to be borne by the SPV.  
·  MoR leased all the existing assets such as land, station buildings etc on the meter gauge section 
to PRCL at historical cost  
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·  A  tripartite  traffic  and  transportation  guarantee  agreement  between  PRCL,  WR  and  GPPL. 
GPPL guaranteed PRCL a minimum of 1 mt, 2 mt and 3 mt cargo in first, second and third 
onwards  years  of  operations.  WR  guaranteed  PRCL  for  the  timely  evacuation  of  cargo  by 
providing adequate number of rolling stocl within a specified time frame.  
·  GPPL had to pay penalty to PRCL as they could not achieve the minimum guaranteed traffic. 
·  Revenue collection by MoR through WR, apportionment to PRCL after deducting operational 
expenses 
·  Delay in finalising contracts at various stages. Construction Agreement took one year to get 
finalized. 
·  In 2008-09, the line carried a total traffic of 1.93 mt, with bulk cargo accounting for 56% and 
containers  accounting  for  another  44%  of  the  total.  During  the  same  period,  the  company 
reported a net loss of Rs 16 cr on an operating income of Rs 69 cr.  
 
5.  Viramgam Mahesana Project Limited (VMPL) (2002) 
 [http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2003/08/04/stories/2003080400060600.htm] 
 
·  First BOT (Annuity) project of IR for gauge conversion of 65 km from MG to BG between 
Viramgam-Mahesana.  (This  project  was  earlier  awarded  on  Build  Operate  Lease  Transfer 
(BOLT) basis in 1996 but did not succeed) 
·  The contract was awarded to consortium led by DS Construction Ltd through a competitive 
bidding process on December 27, 2002. Bid criteria was the lowest semi annual access charges 
quoted by the bidder.  
·  The  project  was  executed  by  Viramgam-Mahesana  Project  Ltd  –  a  special  purpose  vehicle 
promoted by DS Constructions Ltd. 
·  The project would reduce the corridor length between Kandla port and Delhi by about 70 km. 
·  The anticipated traffic on the railway line was about 10 freight trains and two passenger trains 
each way. 
·  The project cost was Rs 90 cr (Rs 63 cr debt and Rs 27 cr equity). Equity was shared by DS 
construction  (45%),  Tantia  constrctions  Company  Ltd  (44%)  and  Vogue  Construction  and 
Consultancy Services Ltd (11%).  
·  The concession period was 12 years. 
·  Railways through a `Tripartite Agreement’ secured the investments of lenders. 
·  The complete supervision of the work was through an `Independent Engineer (IE)’. 
·  The project had achieved financial closure well before its deadline of September 2003, with a 
single financier, UTI Bank, picking up the entire debt component of Rs 63 cr. 
·  As  per  the  agreement,  the  Guaranteed  Access  Charge  (GAC)  would  be  paid  by  IR  to  the 
promoter  on  a  half-yearly  basis  after  commencement  of  operation.  Twenty-four  equal 
instalments for 12 years at the rate of about Rs 7.9 cr per instalment would be paid to the 
concessionaire till the end of the concession period. 
 
6.  Hassan Mangalore Rail Development Company (HMRDC) (2003)  
[Thomas and Ravi, 2008; http://www.icra.in/files/PDF/Pressreleases/March%209,%202009%20HMRDC.pdf] 
 
·  Second joint venture project of IR on BOOT basis. 
·  Conversion of the 183 km MG line between Hassan and Mangalore into a BG line to provide 
BG connectivity to New Mangalore port. A 55 km stretch comes under the ghat section.  
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·  Project cost was Rs 327 cr. This was financed through the equity of Rs 112 cr, debt of Rs 70 cr 
from banks and financial institutions, and subordinate debt Rs 145 cr from IR). 
·  Equity was shared between the Government of Karnataka (40%), MoR (40%), New Mangalore 
Port Trust (9%), Mineral Enterprises Ltd (9%), K-RIDE (2%). 
·  Concession was awarded for 32 Year. EPC contractor: SWR., O&M contractor: SWR 
·  Project was to be completed by December 2004, but shortage of sleepers, delays caused by 
landslips, and associated construction delays pushed the commercial operations date to May 05, 
2006 
·  During the first 11 months of operation, only 1.6 mt freight moved, as against the forecast of 
about 6 mt. 
·  Revenue collection by MoR, apportionment to HMRDC after deducting operational expenses 
·  HMRDC has no say in the key aspects of placement of rakes, availability of wagons, and their 
movement. Customers have to make regular wagon indent and wait. 
·  Once rakes are loaded, their movement is completely under the operational purview of IR. Inter-
divisional and inter-zonal issues, availability of motive power, availability of crew, and even train 
routing is not under the control of any one nodal office. Due to line being in a ghat section, 
operational issues get further compounded and due to this, only 1-2 trains are being moved each 
way, as against the possibility of moving 4-6 trains. 
·  In  2007-08,  HMRDC  carried  4.6  mt  of  freight.  The  major  cargo  was  iron  ore  for  export 
originating from Chitradurga – Tumkur and Hospet – Bellary sectors, accounting for 3 mt of the 
total. During the same period, the company earned a profit after tax of Rs 30 cr on an operating 
income of Rs 134 cr as against a net loss of Rs 14 cr on an operating income of Rs 37 cr in 2006-
07.  
 
7.  Kutch Railway Corporation Limited (KRCL) (2004)  
[Sharma, 2008; Gujarat Infrastructure, 2009] 
 
·  The first special purpose vehicle (SPV) established by RVNL. MoU was signed on 4th January, 
2004 
·  A 301 km long gauge conversion project between Gandhidham and Palanpur to provide shorter 
BG connectivity to Kandla and Mundra ports.  
·  Project cost was Rs 500 cr (debt was Rs 300 cr (on non-recourse basis at interest of 7.5%) and 
equity was Rs 200 cr (full equity was contributed right in the beginning)) 
·  Equity was shares between RVNL (50%), Kandla Port Trust (26%), Gujarat Adani Port Ltd 
(20%) and Government of Gujarat (4%). 
·  Concession was awarded for 32 years. EPC contractor: WR., O&M contractor: WR 
·  MoR leased all the assets of the project line and authorized KRCL to finance, construct, operate, 
maintain and manage the section. KRCL was given the right to receive its share of tariff from 
freight traffic and haulage from container traffic, but not passenger trains that would also ply on 
the line.  
·  Commercial exploitation in the form of managing advertisements space on station platforms, 
rental  fees  from  commercial  establishments  such  as  book-shops,  catering  stalls,  etc  was 
permitted. However, this did not materialize. 
·  No performance guarantees from IR.  
·  Execution was in two phases. First phase involving 248 km between Palanpur – Samakhiali was 
opened  for  traffic  on  24th  March  2006  and  the  balanced  53  kms  between  Samakhiali  -
Gandhidham was commissioned in November 2006.   
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·  Project was completed ahead of schedule and commenced operations in 2007 and with a saving 
of Rs 50 cr in project cost. Substantial savings were achieved due to reduced interest payments 
during the construction period.  
·  KRCL continues to outperform. In the first year, 8.5 mt freight traffic, generating revenue of 
approximately Rs 100 cr. Manpower requirements were rationalized. Staff reduced to 1000 from 
1600 deployed in the MG system.  
·  At this pace of growth in traffic, it is expected that the line will reach the saturation level in the 
next five years. A proposal has therefore been mooted to double the line by the RVNL and take 
up the preliminary studies. 
·  In 2007-08, KRCL handled 17.0 mt of cargo traffic, posting a growth of 81% over the previous 
year.  
·  Along  with  Kandla  port, KRCL  is  planning  to  finance  a  project  involving  the provision of 
railway sidings from Gandhidham to Tuna (10 km) at a cost of Rs 15 cr. 
 
8.  Bharuch Dahej Railway Company Limited (BDRCL) (2005)  
[http://bdrail.in] 
 
·  Gauge conversion of the narrow gauge line of 62 km to broad gauge from Bharuch to Dahej via 
Samni to provide BG connectivity to Dahej port. MoU was signed on 13th January, 2005 
·  This section was closed to rail traffic on 28/06/2005. Prior to closure of this section, two pairs 
of passenger services were running between Bharuch – Samni and one pair of service was run 
between Samni – Dahej daily. 
·  Project cost was Rs 285 cr, with debt to equity ratio being 70:30.  
·  Equity of Rs 85 cr was shared between  RVNL (26.5%), Gujarat Maritime Board (10.5%), Adani 
Petronet  (Dahej)  Port  Pvt.Ltd  (10.5%),  Dahez  SEZ  Ltd  (10.5%),  Gujarat  Narmada  Valley 
Fertilizers Company Ltd (10.5%), Hindalco Industries Ltd (Unit: Birla Copper) (10.5%), Jindal 
Rail Infrastructure Ltd (10.5%). Shareholders are strategic investors in the Project. 
·  Project expected to be commissioned by end of 2010. 
·  Provision shall be made for junction arrangements with the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor. 
As the line is categorized as a feeder route to the Dedicated Freight Corridor, the line is designed 
to take a heavier axle load of 25 tonnes involving use of heavier rails. The developments taking 
place in Dahej are likely to transform the area into a major industrial complex in the next few 
years. 
 




·  A new line project of 82 kms to provide shorter rail connectivity to Paradip port for movement 
of iron-ore for exports and also for the steel plants at Paradip. MoU was signed on 24th May, 
2005 
·  The project cost is Rs 598 cr (originally estimated at Rs 442 cr, with debt to equity ratio being 
54:46. Equity of Rs 275 cr is shared between RVNL (48.4%), Rungta Mines Ltd (10.9%), ESSEL 
Mining and Industries Ltd (10.9%), Paradip Port Trust (10.0%), Jindal Steel and Power (1.8%), 
POSCO India Ltd, (10.0%) MSPL Ltd, (5.5%), SAIL (1.8%) and Government of Orissa (0.7%). 
Shareholders are strategic investors in the Project. 
·  The structuring provides for traffic guaranties by users of the line with take or pay agreement.   
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·  Project suffered delays due to land acquisition problems. Total land required for the rail link was 
1,780 acres. Of this, 1,380 acres is private covering 86 villages in Jagatsinghpur, Kendrapara and 
Jajpur districts.  
·  The then Railway Minster, Mr Nitish Kumar, had laid the foundation stone for the project at 
Marsaghai of Kendrapara district in April 1999 and had promised to complete the project by 
2004. 
 
10. Krishnapatnam Railway Company Limited (2005)  
[http://www.blonnet.com/2005/12/28/stories/2005122801960700.htm] 
 
·  A new railway line project of 111 kms from Obulavaripalle to Krishnapatnam on South Central 
Railway for providing port connectivity to the iron ore belt at Hospet/Bellary. MoU was signed 
on 24th November, 2005 
·  The 113-km long rail link would have several tunnels with a total length of 8.5 km out of which 
one tunnel itself would be seven km long. 
·  The project cost is Rs 588 cr. Project would be funded through a debt equity ratio of 1:.1 and a 
viability gap funding of Rs 50 cr.  
·  The equity of Rs 267 cr would be shared between RVNL (30%), Krishnapatnam Port Company 
Ltd (30%), NMDC Ltd (27%), and Government of Andhra Pradesh (13%). Shareholders are 
strategic investors in the Project. 
·  This rail corridor is being built in two phases. The First phase of 19 km railway line connecting 
the port to the Chennai – Kolkata main line is already operational and will have 9 railway sidings 
inside the port area, out of which 4 will be dedicated for iron ore cargo with wagon tipplers, 3 
will be dedicated for coal cargo with mechanized wagon loaders, stacker reclaimers and 2 will be 
dedicated for general cargo.  
·  Phase two will consists of 91 kms of new broad gauge rail line between Obulavaripalle and 
Krishnapatnam Port. This rail line will reduce the distance between the port and the regions of 
eastern Karnataka and south Andhra Pradesh by 75 kms. Phase two will also consist of further 
11 port sidings inside the port area. 
 
11. Angul Sukinda Railway Limited (ASRL)  
[http://www.business-standard.com/economy/storypage.php?tab=r&autono=262675&subLeft=1&leftnm=3] 
 
·  A 100 kms new railway line project 
·  A vital link between the coal mines in the Talcher area and the iron ore mines at Banspani.     
·  Project cost is Rs 523 cr 
·  Equity of Rs 250 cr is shared between RVNL, Jindal Steel and Power Ltd and Bhushan Steel Ltd 
·  The land required for construction of the rail line is estimated at 1,530 acres.    
 
12. Dighi Port Railway Corporation (DPRC) 
[http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/02/01/stories/2010020153141900.htm] 
 
·  KRC and Balaji Infra Projects Ltd (BIPL) have signed an MoU for developing a 45 km rail-link 
connecting Dighi port near Chiplun in Maharashtra to the main Konkan rail route (connecting 
Dighi port to the main Konkan railheads at Indapur and Mangaon). 
·  This MoU is the first of its kind to be executed between KRCL and a port in Maharashtra. BIPL 
has  undertaken  the  development  of  Dighi  port  through  an  SPV  called  Dighi  Port  Railway  
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Corporation. Project would entail an investment of about Rs 500 cr and the development shall 
span approximately over two years. 
·  Under the MoU, KRC shall acquire land for the railway siding and also develop them. They shall 
also operate and maintain the same and provide the necessary back-up services and rolling stock 
for carrying out the operations. 
·  The entire cost of this development shall be borne by BIPL through a mix of equity and debt.  
 
13. Surat Hazira Railway Company 
[http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/03/04/stories/2006030400340700.htm;   
http://www.orissadiary.com/ShowBussinessNews.asp?id=3179] 
 
·  A 35 km port connectivity project between Surat and Hazira port in Gujarat 
·  The estimated cost of the project is around Rs180 cr, which will be funded 50% by RVNL and 
the  balance  50%  by  Essar  Group,  Hazira  port,  Gujarat  government's  industrial  promotion 
agency and Kribhco together. 
 
14. Panskura Kharagpur (Third) Railway Line (2009) 
[http://www.projectsmonitor.com/ORDCONTRACT/lt-wins-infra-contracts] 
 
·  BOT project 
·  Rs 186 cr order for constructing the 45 km line in West Bengal 
·  L&T bags the award through competitive bidding 
 
15. Private Railways  
[Jain, 2007; http://myiris.com/newsCentre/storyShow.php?fileR=20100614115104707&dir=2010/06/14&secID=fromnewsroom] 
 
The  private  sector  involvement  under  this  model  covers  design,  construction,  financing, 
maintenance and operation. The operation, if desired by the developer, can be done by the IR 
under contract. The following projects have been implemented or under implementation. 
 
Adipur – Mundra (2002) 
 
A 60 kms long new line project providing rail connectivity to the private port of Mundra. The 
project cost is Rs 120 cr. The project concession was given to Gujarat Adani Port Ltd (GAPL). 
Construction and maintenance including financing is done by the private developer. Operation is 
being done by IR under a contract. Apportioned revenue for the portion of the line net of cost 
of operation is given to the port railway by IR. IR receives 2% of the gross revenue as its fee 
from the port railway. 
 
GAPL has announced that it has laid foundation stone for doubling the existing Mundra-Adipur 
private railway line to meet the growing demand of the port. This additional line will be parallel 
to the existing one. The new line will have four crossing stations and 99 bridges. It will be 
capable to handle 25 tonnes axle load wagons at 100 KMPH. The line will be commissioned in 
two phases. The first phase of 30 Km will be commissioned by June 2011 and rest by the end of 
2011-12. 
 
IR has already doubled their track between Samakhiali-Adipur. With the doubling of Adipur - 
Mundra by Adani Group and Samakhiali-Palanpur by the Kutch Railway Company, the entire 
route from Mundra Port to Northern India will be double line, with capacity to handle close to  
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60 mt cargo annually. With this, Mundra Port shall become the second Port after JNPT on the 
West Coast, which shall be connected by double line rail corridor. MoR has already initiated 
construction of double line high speed dedicated freight corridor between Delhi - Mumbai which 
shall pass through Palanpur in the state of Gujarat. This corridor will have connectivity with 
Mundra port through Palanpur-Samakhiali (Gandhidham)-Adipur-Mundra rail line.  
 
Bhadrak – Dhamra 
 
A 60 kms long new line project providing rail connectivity to the Private Port of Dhamra. The 
project cost is Rs 500 cr. The project concession is given to Dhamra Port Company Ltd (DPCL). 
All the activities including operation of trains will be done by the private developer. 
 
Vallarpadam – Idapalli 
 
A  8.5  km  long  new  line  project  providing  rail  connectivity  to  the  newly  developed  private 
container hub of Vallarpadam. The project cost is Rs 240 cr. The financing and construction will 
be done by the private developer. 
 
16. Container Train Operators (CTOs) (2006)  
[MoR, 2006 (b)] 
 
·  On 5th January, 2006, MoR announced a policy wherein it allowed private and public sector 
operators  to  run  container  trains  on  IR  network.  At  the  time  of  this  announcement,  the 
container train operations on IR network were only being carried out by the CONCOR. 
·  The  scheme  was  open  to all  Indian  companies,  including  subsidiaries  of  foreign  companies 
registered in India, having a minimum annual turnover of Rs 1 billion (US$ 20 million approx). 
The validity for permission was for 20 years, further extendable to another 10 years, if the 
container train operator (CTO) performed well.  
·  The entire network of IR was classified and grouped into four categories based on existing and 
anticipated traffic volumes of ports. A one time registration fee of Rs 500 million (US$ 10 
million approx) (for category I license) or Rs 100 million (US$ 2 million approx) (for category II, 
III, and IV license) was payable to MoR.  
·  The rolling stock had to be procured by the operators based on IR approved design, and it 
would have to be inspected by IR as per the rules in force. Locomotives were to be supplied by 
the IR. 
·  Operators were required to either have a rail-linked Inland container Depot (ICD) or give an 
assurance within a period of six months of getting approval that he would construct his own 
ICD within three year or he would arrange to furnish a lease agreement with an existing ICD 
owner. 
·  Operator could carry all goods subject to conditions specified in the goods tariff, red tariff and 
under provision of IR Act and any other instructions issued on the subject by MoR from time to 
time. 
·  The operators were given full freedom for setting tariff from their customers. Operators had to 
pay haulage charges to IR for using its infrastructure. IR reserved the right to change these 
charges in future.  
·  Trains were to be dispatched on a non-discriminatory ‘first come first served’ basis. IR did not 
provide any transit times guarantees.   
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·  The process of registration as well as train operations was uniformly applicable to all including 
CONCOR. The scheme was to be open for one month in a year for registration. 
 
17. Liberalized Wagon Investment Scheme (LWIS) (2008)  
[MoR, 2010] 
  
·  LWIS  allows  investment  by  private  investors  in  Special  Purpose  Wagons  (SPW)  and  High 
Capacity  Wagons  (HCW).  For  the  purpose  of  LWIS,  SPW  are  wagons  designed  for  rail 
transportation of a specific commodity or group of commodities to operate on specific routes or 
close circuits approved by IR. HCW are wagons with payload which is atleast 2 tonnes higher 
than the pay load of existing similar wagons on IR. End users (viz., producers, manufacturers 
and consumers of goods) are permitted to procure wagons under LWIS.  
 
·  Under LWIS, transport of coal and coke, ores and minerals including iron ore are not allowed. 
Each rake procured by investor will have an associated loading and unloading point(s) over 
specific route(s) or close circuit(s) as approved by IR. SPW and HCW procured under this 
scheme will not be merged in wagon pool of IR. For SPW, investor will necessarily need to have 
a private siding or terminal at either end of the approved close circuit.  
 
·  In case of HCW with payload of 2 tonnes or more than pay load of existing similar wagons 
freight concession of 12% for 20 years on each loading will be granted. An additional freight 
concession  of  0.5%  will  be  granted  for  each  additional  tonne  of  payload.  In  case  of  SPW 
operating in approved close circuits a freight concession of 15% for 20 years on each loading is 
available. Maintenance of wagons will be undertaken by IR on payment as per agreements to be 
executed with the investor 
 
18. Wagon Leasing Scheme (WLS) (2008)  
[MoR, 2010] 
 
·  Under this scheme, high capacity wagons (HCW) with a payload of at least 2 tonne more than 
the prevalent 25 tonne and 22.9 tonne axle load wagons or special purpose wagons (SPWs) for 
specific commodities can be owned and leased out by private companies.  
·  Companies with a net worth of at least Rs 250 cr and with a minimum experience of 5 years will 
be eligible for the scheme and will have to pay a one-time registration fee of Rs 5 cr to MoR. It 
will be prevalent for a period for 20 years, following which it can be extended by another 10 
years based on the performance of the leasing company.  
·  The wagon leasing contracts will be a bi-partite agreement between the wagon owner and the 
end user. The wagon leasers will pay a maintenance fee to MoR.  
·  Wagon leasing firms will also get freight discounts between 12 and 15%. HCWs with a payload 
of 2 tonne or more will get a freight discount of 12% and 0.5% for every additional tonne for 20 
years based on the current freight rate. Similarly SPW rakes will attract a 15% discount.  
 
19. Terminal Development Scheme (TDS) (2008) 
[MoR, 2010] 
 
·  This scheme envisages development of new railway terminal through investment from private 
sector. End users, PSUs or their authorized agencies are permitted to develop terminals under 
TDS. Two types of terminals are covered under the scheme:  
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￿  Terminal for  bulk  commodities  -  for  cement, fly  ash  and  fertilizer  transported in  loose 
condition in privately owned special purpose wagons. 
￿  Terminals for finished product - for iron and steel, bagged cement and bagged fertilizer in 
railway wagons.  
·  Under TDS, state-of-the-art private terminals are to be developed under the extant siding policy 
primarily on private land where no bidding or traffic guarantee is required. Railway may allot 
surplus railway land for 30 years lease extendable by 10 years, on the basis of competitive bidding 
and commitment for minimum guaranteed volume of traffic. 
·  For Terminals for bulk commodities, the terminal developer shall be granted freight concession 
of 15% for a period of 20 years on each loading of a new rake of SPW procured under LWIS. In 
addtion, there will be waiver of busy season surcharge and terminal charge. For Terminals for 
finished products, there will be waiver of busy season surcharge for a period of 20 years and 
terminal charge. 
 
20. Luxury Tourist Trains 
 
·  Palace On Wheels (January 26, 1982) 
￿  An agreement between IR and Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation (RTDC) 
￿  Sharing of rolling stock investment on a 50:50 basis 
￿  Sharing of costs according to functional responsibility (RTDC - marketing and commercial, 
IR - operation and maintenance) 
￿  Sharing of revenues on a  67:33 split (IR:RTDC)  
 
·  The Fairy Queen (July 18, 1997) 
 
·  The Deccan Odyssey (January 16, 2004)  
￿  An agreement between MoR and Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation (MTDC) 
￿  Subcontract to Thomas Cook (for front end) and Taj Hotel 
 
·  Golden Chariot (March 12, 2008) 
￿  An  agreement  between  MoR  and  Karnataka  State  Tourism  Development  Corporation 
(KSTDC) 
￿  IR’s haulage charge works out to be Rs 29 lakh for 16 bogeys, Rs 31.5 lakh for 18 bogeys 
and Rs 34.5 lakh for 21 bogeys 
 
“There are more problems for luxury train Golden Chariot. It has to pay Rs 10 lakh more per week to 
MoR, despite incurring losses. With 35% occupancy, the project is yet to break even, for which a 
minimum of 50% occupancy is required.  
 
The  government  on  Saturday  gave  a  representation  to  MoR,  through  minister  of  state  K  H 
Muniyappa,to reconsider increase in haulage charge as it would be difficult to pay. Infrastructure 
minister G Janardhana Reddy held a meeting with Muniyappa. 
 
Ever since the trains operation in February 2008, the state has been paying Rs 18 lakh haulage charge 
per  week.  The  railway  board  has  revised  this  to  Rs  28  lakh  per  week.  Karnataka  State  Tourism 
Development Corporation officials said itll be difficult to pay the new charge, given that the train is 
still a few years from breaking even.  
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IR demands that charges have to be paid in full even if there are less number of bogies. The minimum 
number of bogies is 16.KSTDC also gave a representation to reduce this to 12,and make it more cost-
effective to run the train in off-season. Muniyappa promised to take up the issue. 
 
The MoR and the central tourism ministry have a 25% stake each in the Golden Chariot, while the 
state government has a 50% stake. When the MoU was signed in 2002,it was decided to share profits 
for five years. But the railway board changed the policy in 2007,scrapped the profit-sharing formula 
and fixed haulage charges. Due to low occupancy, there was a 21% relaxation in this for a year. 
 
The state has requested the ministry to either revert to the profit-sharing model, reduce the haulage 
charge or charge it only for the number of rakes that are hired.” [Times of India Bangalore, 1st March, 
2010] 
 
·  Royal Rajasthan on Wheels   
￿  An agreement between MoR and RTDC 
￿  RTDC has to pay haulage charges of about Rs 30 lakhs per trip to IR as per the new policy 
formulated by IR for tourist trains.  
 
·  Maharaja’s Express [http://news.webindia123.com/news/ar_showdetails.asp?id=911160554&cat=&n_date=20091116] 
￿  To be run by Royal Indian Rail Tours (RIRTL), a 50:50 between Cox and Kings (India) Ltd 
and IRCTC  
￿  First pan India tourist luxury train, services to be started in 2010 
￿  The project entails an investment of Rs 45 cr. The train, featuring 23 carriages will run 
between Mumbai and Kolkata and traverse through Gujarat, Rajasthan, Delhi. In the next 
step,  it  will  cover  Agra,  Khajuraho,  Bandhavgarh,  Varanasi  and  Gaya.  The  travel  and 
hospitality company is planning to raise up to Rs 610.39 cr through an initial public offer. 
 
·  Tourist train by Oberoi 
[http://news.webindia123.com/news/ar_showdetails.asp?id=1001200649&cat=&n_date=20100120] 
￿  In January 2010, the Punjab Government has given its approval to the Oberoi Hotels Group 
to be partners with the state in the luxury train project which had been approved by the 
MoR. The Oberoi Group was the single bidder for the luxury tourists train project. For this 
project, the group would pay Rs 90 lakhs per annum to the state. 
 
21. Catering 
[Raghuram, 2007;  
http://www.indianrailways.gov.in/indianrailways/directorate/traffic_comm/COMM-CIR-2K10/CC_35_10.pdf] 
 
IRCTC, a subsidiary of IR, was in charge of catering services on trains and railway stations across 
India. Depending on the distance covered by the train and average passenger load factor, the 
railways either equips trains with their own pantry cars or provides meals at select stations en 
route. 
 
A catering policy was introduced in June 2004 and further amended twice in 2005 covering stalls, 
refreshment rooms and onboard services. An important feature of this policy was allotment of 
minor catering units at important stations through open two packet competitive bidding system, 
while at less important stations and stalls reserved for weaker sections of society, the earlier 
system based on 'calling of applications' was retained.  
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With this policy, as an example, an annual catering contract for an important train like Howrah-
Kalka  mail  was  awarded  for  Rs  83.6  lakhs,  when  earlier  it  fetched  Rs  5  lakhs.  After  open 
competitive bidding, earnings have increased from Rs 13 cr to over Rs 100 cr due to mobile 
catering. On stationary catering, due to the open competitive bidding, as an example, the license 
fee at Bandra and Nagpur went up from Rs 78,000 and Rs 32,000 to Rs 16 lakhs and Rs 34 lakhs 
respectively. The pace of open bidding for stationary units has been slowed down since some of 
the incumbents have gone to courts to contest IR’s move [MD, IRCTC]. 
 
Railway  Minister  in  her  budget  speech  of  2010-11  said,  “Since  we  have  received  several 
complaints, we have decided to provide catering departmentally in selected trains. The Catering 
Policy is under revision and will be finalized as early as possible.” 
 
Vision  2020  says,  “Quality  of  catering  would  be  improved  by  adopting  sound  and  proven 
business  practices,  setting  up  a  chain  of  modern  base-kitchens  and  branded  restaurants  at 
stations and encouraging innovation and local cuisines in on-board catering.” 
 
A new catering policy has been announced in July 2010. As per this policy, IR will progressively 
take over management of all mobile catering services including base kitchens and mobile catering 
through departmental catering in a phased manner. All existing major and minor catering units 
will be awarded and managed by the zonal railways, except food plaza, food courts, fast food 
units. All such contracts, presently being managed by IRCTC, on expiry of the contract period 
will be awarded by the zonal railways. IRCTC will not renew any contract required to be handed 
over to zonal railways on expiry of the contract. IRCTC will be primarily responsible for running 
of food plazas, food courts, and fast food units within the ambit of this policy. At the time of 
this policy, IRCTC was responsible for serving food in about 300 trains including Rajdhani, 
Duronto and Shatabdi.  
 
22. Parcel Operations 
[MoR, 2009a and MoR, 2010] 
 
IR has introduced the scheme for leasing of parcel space in the Brake Vans (SLRs), Assistant 
Guard’s Cabin (AGC) and Parcel Vans (VPHs) of passenger carrying trains. Under this scheme, 
parcel space is leased out to private operators by inviting bids through open tenders.  
 
To encourage leasing to the maximum possible extent, reserve price for leasing of parcel space in 
Brake Vans/Parcel Vans/Assistant Guard’s Cabin has been kept attractive and realistic. Based 
on the same concept, Parcel Express trains with minimum composition of 15 Parcel Vans + 1 
Brake Van are also leased out to the private operators. 
 
Vision 2020, “Parcel services will be managed as a separate business and run from dedicated 
terminals with separate parcel trains rather than from station platforms. On major routes, this 
service will be run as efficiently and professionally as air cargo services. The revenue from parcel 
services would be targeted for at least a five fold increase in ten years from the present level of 
around Rs  1600 cr per annum.” 
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23. Budget Hotels 
[http://www.zoomdevelopers.com/images/News/news2.pdf] 
 
IRCTC announced in 2006 to set up around 100 budget rail hotels across the country. 20 such 
concessions have already been awarded. Of these, 11 were won by the Zoom Developers-Royal 
Orchid consortium, five by Essel Group and four had gone to Signet Group. The hotels will be 
set up under the name of Rail Ratna in five cities - Chandigarh, Sealdah (West Bengal), Madurai 
(Tamil Nadu), Vijayawada and Secunderabad (Andhra Pradesh) in the first phase. The IRCTC 
land will be leased out to the hospitality sector on behalf of the railways and finalize the bids for 
30 years to construct, operate and maintain the hotel as per the terms and conditions specified in 
the bid document.  
 
24. Cleaning of Coaches 
[http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=55072&kwd=] 
 
Intensive mechanized cleaning of coaches in the coaching depots has been outsourced through 
professional agencies in 42 coaching depots on IR. 
 
Limited  mechanized  cleaning  attention  to  identified  trains  during  their  scheduled  stoppage 
enroute has also been outsourced at nominated 27 “Clean Train Stations” on IR. 
 
Existing Railway Staff deployed for cleaning activities in coaches have not been/shall not be 
affected at all by the measures as above. These initiatives are primarily to enhance the levels of 
cleanliness and hygiene in trains. 
 
[Compiled by the authors]  
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Exhibit 4: PPPs in the Pipeline 
 
1.  Rolling Stock Manufacturing 
 
a.  Electric Locomotive Factory at Madhepura, Bihar  
 
A decision was taken in February 2007 to set up a greenfield locomotive factory at Madhepura with 
an investment of Rs 18,000 cr. The project was to be taken up on PPP where a JV would be formed 
with an international manufacturer. The selection of the international partner was to be done through 
an international competitive bidding. MoR was to hold 26% equity stakes in the JV and the rest 74% 
equity  stakes  were  to  be  brought  in  by  the  JV  partner.  The  bidding  was  a  two  stage  process 
comprising of technical and financial bids.  
 
In May 2008, bids were invited from the interested players. Five companies namely Alstom (France), 
Bombardier (Germany), Siemens (Germany), a consortium comprising China-based CSR Zhuzhou 
Electric Loco Works and Monnet International, and a Japanese consortium comprising Mitsubishi, 
Kawasaki and Toshiba had submitted application for the technical bids. MoR short listed three 
bidders – Alstom, Bombardier and Siemens. In September 2008, second round of bidding took place 
where draft RFP was issued to the three short listed bidders. However, none of the bidders applied 
for the financial bid.  
 
Following this, MoR decided to set up the unit as Railway’s production unit. The cabinet approved 
this decision on 23th February 2009. Further, in December 2009, the MR accorded approval to 
revert back to JV mode which was approved by the cabinet. In March 2010, a fresh RFQ has been 
issued to interested applicants. 
 
b.  Diesel Locomotive Factory at Marhowra, Bihar 
 
A greenfield diesel locomotive factory at Marhowra was approved in February 2007 with a cost of Rs 
Rs 2052 cr. This project was decided to be taken up on PPP, on the same lines as for the electric 
locomotive  factory  at  Madhepura,  through  an  international  competitive  bidding  in  a  two  stage 
process.  
 
Two players, GE India and US based EMD were short listed after the technical bids. Only GE 
submitted the financial bid offering to be a 51% partner. MoR did not want to take any decision 
based on the single bid and decided to set up the unit as Railway’s production unit. The cabinet 
approved  this  decision  on  23th  February  2009.  Further,  in  December  2009,  the  MR  accorded 
approval to revert back to JV mode which was approved by the cabinet. In March 2010, a fresh RFQ 
has been issued to interested applicants. 
 
c.  Rail Coach Factory at Rae Bareilly, UP 
 
Railways  announced  in  November  2006  to  set  up  a  rail  coach  factory  at  Rae  Bareilly  with  an 
investment of Rs 1685 cr. This project was decided to be taken up on PPP, on the same lines as for 
greenfield locomotive factories, through an international competitive bidding in a two stage process. 
UPA Chairperson laid the foundation stone in February 2007. In August 2008, six bids were received 
including Reliance Infrastructure - China South Railway, L&T - China North Railway, Texmaco - 
Kawasaki-Mitsubishi, Jessops - Siemens, CAF of Spain, and Bombardier.   
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A total of 1230 acres of land was required of which government land was 467 acres and remaining 
was of Panchayat and private land. The private land belonged to nine villagers. There were issues in 
land acquisition as the villagers had filed a public interest litigation. 
 
2.  World Class Railway Stations 
 
A total of 50 railway stations have been identified for developing into world class stations till 2020. 
Of these, 12 stations will be taken in the first phase ie till 2011-12. Anand Vihar and Bijwasan in 
Delhi are among the first greenfield world class railway stations to be completed in phase I.  
 
However, Rs 12,000 cr New Delhi station modernisation project has not gone as envisaged. The 
ambitious project has been delayed for various reasons including cross ownership which caused 
discomfort for the bidders. The ambitious project has also run into obstacles with the New Delhi 
Municipal Corporation (NDMC), Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Delhi Traffic Police 
suggesting that the Railway authorities restrict their plan to simply constructing a modern station and 
ignore plans for additional passenger facilities or real estate development. It has been pointed out 
that commercial development of railway land in the vicinity of the station compound traffic woes. 
Eight companies including L&T Transco, DLF and GVK Developmental Projects and Mumbai-
based Trif Infrastructure had cleared the first round of qualification for the project after the railways 
changed the qualifying criteria. 
 




A MMLP is defined as a rail based intermodal traffic handling facility complex comprising container 
terminals, bulk / break-bulk cargo terminals, warehouses, banking and office space and facilities for 
mechanized handling, inter-modal transfers, sorting/grading, cold chain, aggregation/disaggregation, 
etc, to handle freight. 
 
The IR has planned a few mega MMLPs at select locations along the Dedicated Freight Corridors 
(DFC) to reduce the overall logistics cost in the supply chain for the customers, duly leveraging the 
modern,  efficient,  high-capacity  rail  connectivity  of  the  DFCs  capable  of  meeting  time-sensitive 
freight transportation requirement. 
 
To develop these MMPLs through PPP, the MoR has invited Expression of Interests (EOI) in 
February 2009 seeking essential information regarding proposed locations, land area required and 
type/segment of logistics business to be developed from large logistics service providers, real estate 
developers, third party logistics players, warehousing investors, container operators and financial 
institutions. 
 
The bids invited by the IR received an enthusiastic response from leading logistics players like Sical 
Logistics,  World  Windows  Infrastructure,  Container  Corp  of  India,  DHL  Logistics,  Mahindra 
Logistics, Transport Corporation of India, GATI and Adani Logistics. 
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4.  High Speed Corridors 
[MoR, 2009a] 
 
Minister  of  Railways  in  her  budget  speech  in  February  2010  said,  “construction  of  high  speed 
passenger rail corridors is another transformational initiative that railways will embark upon in the 
coming years. IR propose to invest in developing high speed corridors of 250 to 350 kmph speed. 
Already six corridors have been identified. These projects would require large investments and will be 
executed through PPP mode.” 
 








It is envisaged that by 2020, at least four corridors of 2000 kms would be developed and planning for 
8 other corridors would be in different stages of progress. 
 
5.  High Speed Rail Link to Bengaluru Airport 
[http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/04/27/stories/2010042752101800.htm] 
 
The 34 km high speed rail link to Bengaluru International Airport (BIA) is the Rs 6,900 cr project, 
which  is  coming  up  with  the  viability  gap  funding  (VGF)  from  the  central  government.  The 
Karnataka government would contribute Rs 532 cr. Five consortiums (Reliance Infrastructure, CSR 
Nanjing Rolling Stock Company Ltd, Pioneer Infratech Pvt Ltd - Siemens Project Ventures, Lanco 
Infratech  Pvt  Ltd  -  OHL  Concessions  S.L,  and  L&T  Transco  Ltd  -  ITD-ITD  Cem-Soma 
Enterprises) have been asked to submit the bids out of the 27 companies who had shown interest for 
this project. Bids will be opened on August 12, 2010 and the letter of award would be issued on 
September 17, 2010.  
 
6.  Non-core Activities 
[MoR, 2009a] 
 
Non core activities relate to assets and services that are not considered essential to train operations. 
Vision 2020 states on this “commercial utilization of vacant railway land, not required for operational 
use, can generate sustainable streams of revenue to finance the growth of railways. This will be done 
in a professional, transparent and accountable manner. Some of such land may also be utilized for 
setting up of schools, medical colleges, nursing colleges, etc. where wards of railway employees will 
have priority in admission. Some of such land may also be utilized for setting up of schools, medical 
colleges, nursing colleges, etc. where wards of railway employees will have priority in admission.” 
 
7.  Special Freight Train Operator (SFTO) Scheme (2010) 
[http://www.domain-b.com/companies/companies_I/Indian_Railways/20100610_freight_trai.html] 
 
On the lines of container train operators, for commodities requiring specialized wagons, MoR has 
introduced SFTO scheme in June 2010. The scheme aims to increase the share of railways in the 
movement of non conventional traffic like bulk cement, bulk fertilisers, fly ash, selected chemicals  
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and petrochemical, bulk alumina, steel products requiring SPW, vegetable oil, molasses and caustic 
soda that require the deployment of special purpose wagons. There are five categories based on 
commodity types. 
 
The policy provides for a concession period of 20 years, extendable till expiry of life of wagon. The 
maintenance of wagons during this period will be provided by IR at its own cost except for the cost 
of special components, which will be paid by the owner of these wagons. The policy envisages train 
operators charging tariff from end users, while also functioning as the consignor and consignee. 
 
Those investing in the SFTO scheme will be eligible for a rebate of 12% on the base freight for 20 
years or recovery of their cost, whichever is earlier. In the case of high capacity wagons with a 
throughput that exceeds 10% of the existing throughput, an additional rebate of 2% for each increase 
of 10% will be offered for the additional tonnage for 20 years or till they recover their cost. Investors 
will be required to make a minimum investment of three rakes.  
 
According to MoR, investors in this scheme will benefit from flexible loading and unloading points 
based on market demand, and will be free to induct rakes taken on lease. Moreover, they will not be 
permitted to load any commodity on the return leg of the wagons and be eligible for a freight rebate 
of 10%. Investors will also be free to bring in wagons of new designs with a higher carrying capacity 
that would entitle them to higher rebates. 
 
The selection of SFTO will be made after inviting competitive bids which will be in two parts ie 
technical and financial bid. 
 
8.  Private Freight Terminal (PFT) Scheme (2010) 
[http://www.indianrailways.gov.in/indianrailways/directorate/traffic_comm/Draft_Policy/PFT_090410.pdf] 
 
To enable rapid development of network of freight handling terminals with the participation of 
private sector, MoR has introduced PFT scheme in June 2010. PFTs (green or brownfield) shall be 
set up only on private land. However, for rail connectivity, railway land can be offered as per extant 
rule. They can handle all traffic except outward coal, coke and iron ore. PFTs would provide various 
logistics related services like warehousing facilities, value addition services like palletization, labeling , 
processing of goods with adequate inter modal facility and convenience centre etc. The scheme is 
open to registered CTOs. Setting up of a terminal exclusively for container traffic by CTOs will be 
governed by the concession agreement signed between CTO and IR. However, if container terminal 
is converted to a PFT, it will be governed by this policy. 
 
An application fee of Rs 1 cr and security deposit of an equal amount would be charged to ensure 
timely commissioning of PFT, which can provide value added logistics related services and charge 
for the same.  
 
The period of agreement would be for 20 years and could be extended by period of 10 years. Further 
extension would be permitted on the basis of extant policy at the time of such extension, sources 
said.  
 
IR’s share would be equivalent to 50% of terminal charge or Rs 10 per tonne, whichever is higher, 
with a suspension of two years for brown field and five years for green field PFT. 
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To increase the modal share of railways in transportation of automobiles, which is one of the fastest 
growing industries in India, MoR has come up with a policy on development of automobile and 
ancillary hub. With the induction of high capacity auto carriers, having higher throughput as planned 
by the IR and as proposed under Automobile Freight Train Operator (AFTO), more number of 
rakes will be inducted with competitive freight structure. 
 
Under  this  policy,  any  registered  company  in  India  ie  manufacture  of  automobile  or  logistics 
company or Society for Indian Automobile Manufacturer (SIAM) or registered freight train operator 
having annual turnover of Rs 20 cr during last financial year, can apply. Railway land will be provided 
for such hubs on license basis initially for a period of 7 years extendable every year thereafter on the 
basis of review carried out by the zonal railways based on the performance. The license fee shall be 
payable as per extant policy. The licencee would be allowed a maximum of one year from the date of 
handing over the land as gestation period to complete construction of the hub in all respects and 
make  the  same  operational.  Automobile  and  ancillary  hubs  shall  be  a  common  user  facility  for 
general use of the automobile industry, without any exclusive right. 
 
According to MoR, development of automobile and ancillary hubs will provide an opportunity to 
automobile  manufacturers to  carry  their  traffic  by rail  in  bulk  and  do  secondary  distribution  to 
consuming centers in the immediate catchments areas from such hubs. Similarly they can also do 
aggregation of automobile at such hubs so as to offer full rake load to IR. 
 
10. New R3i Policy (2010) 
[http://www.indianrailways.gov.in/indianrailways/directorate/planning/downloads/R3i_circular_new.pdf] 
 
This policy is aimed at attracting private sector participation in rail connectivity projects so that 
additional rail transport capacity can be created. This policy shall not be applicable to lines intending 
to provide connectivity to coal mines and iron ore mines directly or indirectly. Only those new line 
proposals which are 20 kms or more in length (excluding the length of siding which may take off 
from this line) shall be eligible under this policy. The policy allows four models: 
 
(a)  Cost sharing freight rebate model  
 
The percentage contribution of the applicant should be minimum 50% of the project cost. Land will 
be acquired by the railways at applicant’s cost. The ownership of land and line will remain with 
railways. A freight rebate of 10%-12% on incremental outward traffic (incremental traffic being 
reckoned as the traffic which is over and above the level of traffic moved by rail at the time of the 
sanction  of  the  project).  The  freight  rebate  will  be  valid  till  the  party  recovers  the  advance 
contribution made by it or for a period of 10 years from the date of commissioning of the line, 
whichever is earlier. Construction of the line will be undertaken by the railways. O&M shall be 
undertaken by the railways at its own cost. 
 
(b) Full contribution apportioned earning model  
 
The applicants would make the 100% contribution towards the project cost. Land will be acquired by 
the railways at applicant’s cost. The ownership of land and line will remain with railways. Applicant 
will  construct  and  maintain  the  line  for  25  years.  For  a  period  of  25  years  from  the  date  of  
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commissioning of the line, the applicant would be entitled to receive the apportioned earnings from 
the line less the O&M costs incurred by the railways on the line. Railways would levy a fee of 2% on 
the gross apportioned earnings of the applicant’s share for the first ten years from the date of 
commissioning and 4% thereafter till the completion of the concession period of 25 years. 
 
(c) The SPV model  
 
This model will be  applicable to both (i)  lines likely to be embedded in the existing railway network 
as well as and (ii) lines taking off from the mainline and terminating into a dead end terminal be it a 
port, steel plant etc.  
 
An SPV shall be formed between railways and the applicant and railways share in equity will generally 
be 26%. Land will be acquired by the SPV at its cost but ownership of land will vest with IR. The 
original cost of acquisition of land will be returned to the SPV at the end of the concession period 
without any escalation what so ever.  
 
SPV shall be granted a concession to construct, operate and maintain the line and in consideration 
there  of,  it  shall  be  granted  a  share  in  the  revenue  generated  on  the  project  line.  (i)  For  Port 
connectivity projects: first 10 years of operation, 100% freight apportionment less O&M charges, and 
for next twenty years, 98% freight apportionment less O&M charges. (ii) For embedded line projects: 
(a) for project related traffic: first 10 years of operation, 95% freight apportionment less O&M 
charges, and next twenty years, 90% apportionment less O&M chargesb), (b) for other than project 
related traffic/diverted traffic: 80% apportionment less O&M charges for 30 years. in both the cases 
the concession shall lapse as soon as the NPV on the project equity reaches zero at a discounted rate 
of 14%. 
 
Construction could be done by the SPV itself through competitive bidding or by railways or RVNL 
for SPV at the cost of SPV and at the option of SPV. O&M shall be undertaken for the SPV by the 
railways for which SPV shall reimburse the costs. 
 
(d) The private line model  
 
Applicable when a private line is built by the applicant on privately acquired non-railway land and 
connectivity is sought to the railway’s network. Applicant will construct and maintain the line for a 
period of 30 years. Railways would enter into an O&M agreement with the applicant for a period of 
30 years. Apportioned revenue less O&M expenditure incurred by Railways would be paid to the 
applicant. Railways would levy a fee at the following rate on the gross apportioned earnings: (i) 0 -5 
years – Nil, (ii) 5-10 years - 2%, (iii) 10-20 years - 3%, and (iV) 20-30 years - 4%. The fee shall be 
reviewed mutually at the end of 10 year and 20 year period. At the end of the 30 years period, the 
Railways will have the right to take over the line at zero cost. Railways would pay the cost of the land 
to the party. 
 
While applicants may choose and indicate preference for one of the models, MoR reserves the right 
to decide which model shall be applicable and that decision shall be final. 
 
[Compiled by the authors]  
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Exhibit 5: Set of Concerns by PRCL 
 
 
PRCL started operations from March 2003. They could not meet the traffic guarantee in the early 
years of operation, primarily due to GPPL offering low traffic. Some time in late 2005, after a couple 
of  years  of  operation,  the  Managing  Director  of  PRCL  made  the  following suggestions  for  the 
Concession Agreement and the Shareholders Agreement:  
 
Concession Agreement 
•  SPV company should be given the right to commercial exploitation of project assets including 
land, buildings, etc. (Clause 4.2)  
•  SPV company should be given power to quote freight rates on its line. (Clause 4.2) 
•  MOR should charge lease rent in respect of assets leased to SPV at par with the lease rent 
charged from other SPV like HMRDC and KRCL. (Clause 4.4) 
•  SPV company should be given the right to mortgage the project assets developed by it on the 
project as security with the lenders for raising debt for the project. (Clause 4.3) 
•  SPV company should be given power to appoint its own agency for construction, operation and 
maintenance of the railway line. (Clause 4.3) 
•  SPV company should be paid access charges for running passenger trains and trains of other 
parties on its line. (Clause 4.4) 
Shareholders Agreement 
•  Shareholders should bring their equity contribution in full before the raising of debt by the 
company or at least give bank guarantee for the balance equity. (Clause 8.1) 
•  In case the full equity contribution is not brought by the shareholders, the company should issue 
partly paid up shares and make cash calls to the shareholders in three stages (Clause 8.3): 
o  25% of the face value of the share should be called immediately after formation of the 
company as application money 
o  25% of the face value of share should be called at the time of allotment of the shares. 
o  50% of the face value of the share should be called as per funds requirements of the project 
as call money. 
•  In case of default in payment of cash calls, the company should be allowed to forfeit the shares 
and reissue them to new persons.  
•  Interest on the delayed payment of cash calls should be equal to prime lending rate of State Bank 
of India. (Clause 9.2) 
•  Traffic guarantee should not be a condition for either shareholder. (Clause 21.4)  
•  Traffic projections for the project should be realistic and it should not be inflated just to raise 
debt from the lenders which later on become difficult to realize. 
•  In case the company is not able to generate sufficient revenue in the initial years of commercial 
operations to service the debt, the shareholders should ensure adequate cash inflows for the 
company. This should be incorporated in the SHA.  
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•  SPV should be headed by a person designated as MD/CEO who should be a member of the 
Board and should have voting powers like other Directors. (Refer clause 6.6) 
•  MD will work under the control of Board of Directors represented by all the shareholders. 
(Clause 6.6.3) 
•  The Directors nominated by the shareholder should not interfere in the day to day functioning 
of the company. (Clause 6.3) 
•  MD should be given adequate power to run the company professionally. (Clause 5.3) 
•  Expenses incurred by a shareholder on the project may be capitalized after it is review by an 
independent accounting firm and not necessarily the auditor appointed by the other shareholder. 
(Clauses 4.4 and 4.5) 
•  Expenses related to traveling and lodging incurred by Directors in attending Board meetings 
committee should be borne by the company. (Clause 6.2.3) 
•  Debt for the project should be raised by the company and not by the private shareholders. 
(Clause 8.7) 
•  The company should be allowed to go for IPO to raise funds from the market after first year of 
commercial operation date. (Clause 12.6.7) 
•  Arrangements for viability gap funding –  
o  by Government? 
o  by Shareholders? 
•  SHA should provide for infusion of additional equity of gap funding by both shareholders in 
case of delay in viability. 
•  Staffing pattern of new line be decided by the company and not by IR. Allow free run of 
automation and mechanical maintenance. If necessary by private professional agencies other than 
IR. 
 
[PRCL, 2005]  
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Exhibit 6: Discontinued Partnership Concepts in IR 
 
 
1.  Own Your Wagon Scheme (OYWS) (1992) 
[http://www.cag.gov.in/reports/railways/2002_book2/chapter1.htm] 
 
The MoR (Railway Board) launched ‘Own Your Wagon Scheme’ (OYWS) in the year 1992 as a 
participative marketing strategy to enhance the rail transport capacity to meet the needs of various 
sections of the economy by encouraging private parties to own their wagons and thereby help and 
supplement  the  resources  of  railways  for  acquisition  of  Rolling  Stock.  The  scheme  invited 
investments from bulk users and financing/ leasing companies on the basis of ownership of wagons 
in units of trainloads. 
 
The salient features of the scheme were as follows: 
￿  The IR will pay to the owners 14.5% (subsequently revised to 16%) lease charges (per annum) 
for the first 10 years and 1% lease charges (per annum) for subsequent 10 years.  
￿  The investors can procure the wagons either through the railways or directly from the approved 
wagon builders on payment of design loan, inspection and administrative charges as applicable.  
￿  The users/ owners will also have the benefits of guaranteed clearance of a mutually agreed 
specified quantum/ tonnage of the specific commodity/ product during a specified period.  
 
The benefits admissible to different categories were as under: 
 
Category ‘A’: Pure lease 
￿  Lease charges for the primary period of 10 years at the rate of 14.5% (subsequently revised to 
16%)  per  annum  on  current  cost  (original  procurement  price)  of  the  wagons  leased  to  the 
railways. For the secondary period of 10 years at the rate of 1% per annum of the current cost of 
the wagons. Should the wagons be found fit for further service after expiry of the 20 years 
period, the lease would continue on mutually agreed terms.  
￿  Freight at normal tariff rates.  
 
Category ‘B’: Lease cum guaranteed clearance with General Service wagons 
￿  Lease charges as above.  
￿  Guaranteed  clearance  of  mutually  agreed  specified  quantum/  tonnage  of  the  specific 
commodity/ product during a specified period subject to certain conditions.  
￿  Freight at normal tariff rates  
 
Category ‘C’: Guaranteed Clearance with Special Wagons 
￿  Lease charges will not be payable to the owners of special wagons moving in dedicated circuits 
and involving empty running in one direction.  
￿  Lump-sum  freight  rate  mutually  negotiated  would  be  quoted  for  the  identified  dedicated 
movement taking into account the cost of haulage in the loaded and empty direction, terminal 
marshalling and other costs, subject to revision every year along with the Annual Railway Budget 
exercise.  
 
Under the scheme the investor can procure the wagons either through the railways or directly from 
the approved wagon builders. If it is procured through railways, party will pay railways 3% of the cost 
of wagons as service charges, which will cover design loan, inspection and administrative charges. If,  
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however, the party procures the wagons directly from approved manufacturers he will have to pay 
only 1.5% towards design loan and inspection charges. 
 
The scheme also provided that IR would pay lease charges to the leasing companies in advance on 
quarterly basis. The calculation of lease charges will be based on the last tendered price of similar 
wagons  procured  by  IR  during  relevant  period  or  actual  procurement  price  paid  by  the  party 
whichever is less. Contrary to the above provision, the Railway Board, based on the representations 
of Oil Industry accepted the actual procurement price, details of which are given below, even though 
it was higher than the last tendered price for similar wagons procured by IR for the purpose of 
calculation of lease charges. The main reason for accepting the actual procurement price was the 
additional payment made by the party for procurement of free supply items like steel, wheel sets and 
roller bearings on account of excise duty etc. 
 
2.  Build Own Lease Transfer (BOLT) (1994) 
[Jain, 2007] 
 
In 1994-95, BOLT scheme was launched to attract private investment in railways. Response to this 
scheme was poor. Of the 14 projects bid through this route, 12 were cancelled due to unacceptability 
high lease charges. Two concessions for projects namely, Viramgam-Mehsana Gauge Conversion and 
Mudkhed - Adilabad gauge conversion were awarded, but did not succeed as developers could not 
achieve financial closure. The concessions were terminated midway. Major reasons for the failure wee 
as under:  
 
(i) The concession agreement was not a bankable document. It did not recognize the role of a lender 
and did not address their concerns. 
(ii) Bidders saw a lot of risk as prior availability of land, design, drawings etc. was not ensured. 
(iii) Risks were not allocated optionally and fairly. 
 
This scheme has been rehashed by IR to remove its shortcomings and it has been re-launched as 
BOT (annuity scheme) 
 
3.  Wagon Investment Scheme (WIS) (2005) 
[http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/04/13/stories/2005041300770700.htm] 
 
The essence of the scheme is that it focuses on assured supply of guaranteed number of rakes every 
month to a customer based on the number of rakes procured by him. Also freight concessions will 
be allowed to him. The wagons under the scheme can be procured by individuals, corporate bodies 
or association or groups of companies such as integrated steel plants of SAIL or a group of cement 
companies in a cluster.  
 
The customers who do not have own sidings can also participate in the scheme. The scheme also 
provides for supply of bonus rakes whose number will increase for those customers opting for 
Engine-On-Load system.  
 
As for the mode of procurement, the customers can procure the wagons directly from the builders 
approved by the MoR subject to current IR Standard design and specifications and inspection by the 
nominated agency of the railways namely RDSO. All critical components will be procured from 
RDSO approved sources and to current IRS specifications.  
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The wagons can also be procured through wagon builder in a foreign country subject to IR Standard 
designs and specifications and subject to inspection by the nominated agency of the railways. The 
foreign  exchange  or  its  equivalent,  if  any,  for  imported  components  would  be  provided  for 
customers participating in the scheme.  
 
The customer can procure any number of wagons in a unit of rake loads without any ceiling subject 
to a minimum of one rake and four percent additional wagons as maintenance spare. Procurement of 
wagons in piecemeal shall not be permitted.  
 
To begin with, two types of wagons, namely, BCN (covered) wagons and open (Box N) wagons can 
be procured under the scheme. In both the categories, 10% freight rebate will be admissible - 15 
years  for  covered  wagons  and  10  years  for  the  open  type.  The  customers  will  be  eligible  for 
guaranteed  supply  of  four rakes  a  month for  covered  wagons  and  six  rakes  a month for  open 
wagons. In addition, a guaranteed supply of two bonus rakes will be made available without freight 
concession or penalty to those opting for the Engine-On-Load scheme.  
 
The WIS is an improvement over the earlier OYWS in several ways. Thus, unlike OYWS which 
flopped, no lease charges shall be payable under the present scheme. Second, any escalation in rates 
and tariffs is taken care of as the rebate is in percentage. Third, unlike OYWS, it is not linked to PLR 
and therefore much simpler and more transparent. 
 
 
[Compiled by the authors] 
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Exhibit 7: A Comparison of Wagon Related PPPs 
 
 
  Own Your Wagon Scheme 
(OYWS) 
Wagon Investment Scheme  
(WIS) 
Liberalized Wagon 
Investment Scheme (LWIS) 
Wagon Leasing Scheme 
(WLS) 
Who can invest  •  Bulk users 
•  Financing/leasing companies 
•  Individuals as producers 
•  Corporate entity as producers 
•  Wagon leasing companies2 
•  End users 
•  Wagon leasing companies 
Types of wagons  any  •  BCN 
•  BOXN 
•  HCW3 
•  SPW4 
•  HCW 
•  SPW 




From IR or directly from 
wagon manufacturer 
Directly from wagon  
manufacturer or import 
Directly from wagon 
manufacturer or import 
Directly from wagon 
manufacturer or import 
Restricted 
commodities 
no  no  Coal and coke, ores and 
minerals including iron ore 
Coal and coke, ores and 
minerals including iron ore 
•  Pure Lease 
(IR will pay 16% lease charge 
per annum for the first 10 years 
to owners.) 
•  BCN 
10% freight concession for 15 years. 
 4 guaranteed rakes per month 
 
2 additional rakes without EOL scheme and 4 
additional rakes with EOL scheme as bonus per 
month without freight concession  
•  HCW 




•  HCW 
12% freight concession for 
20 years.  
Benefits 
•  Lease cum Guaranteed 
Clearance with General 
Service wagons 
(Lease charges as above. IR 
assures the lessor to clear a 
minimum volume of traffic 
during a specific period.) 
•  BOXN 
10% freight concession for 10 years.  
6 guaranteed rakes per month 
 
2 additional rakes without EOL scheme and 4 
additional rakes with EOL scheme as bonus per 
month without freight concession 
•  SPW 
15% freight concession for 20 
years 
•  SPW 
15% freight concession for 
20 years 
                                                 
2Wagon Leasing Company: A Leasing Company engaged in the business of procuring railway wagons and making them available to other business entities 
authorized to deploy such wagons for operation over IR network in accordance with the extant policy of MoR 
3 High Capacity Wagons: Wagons with payload which are at least 2 tons higher than the payload of extant similar wagons on IR for 25.0 or 22.9 tons axle 
load route, as the case may be. 
4 Special Purpose Wagons: Wagons designed for rail transportation of a specific commodity or group of commodities.  
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  Own Your Wagon Scheme 
(OYWS) 
Wagon Investment Scheme  
(WIS) 
Liberalized Wagon 
Investment Scheme (LWIS) 
Wagon Leasing Scheme 
(WLS) 
•  Guaranteed Clearance with 
Special Wagons 
(No lease charges to owners. 
Concession in freight rates) 
    No benefits if wagons are 
leased to contractors 
Wagon 
maintenance 
IR, without any extra cost 
(chargeable for special wagons) 
IR, without any extra cost  IR, on payment basis  IR, on payment basis 
Empty run  Not charged  Not charged  Class 100  Class 100 
Dispute resolution  By three arbitrators. One 
arbitrator is to be nominated by 
the Investor, the other by the 
Railways and the third by 
mutual agreement between the 
parties 
By three arbitrators. One arbitrator is to be 
nominated by the Investor, the other by the 
Railways and the third by mutual agreement 
between the parties 
By arbitrator nominated by the 
General Manager of the Zonal 
Railway 
By arbitrator nominated by 
the General Manager of 
the Zonal Railway 
[Authors’ Analysis]  
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Exhibits 8: Lessons from Container Train Operations 
 
 
“Introduction of competing entities has provided the much needed choice to users of container 
services. It has led to expansion in capacity. The new concessionaires have acquired 89 container 
trains as compared to 189 trains owned by CONCOR as of September 2009. Inability of IR to 
provide or promote common ICDs coupled with the restricted commodities has constrained the 
growth potential.  
 
The evolution of policy in this case sheds light on the nature of impediments that are faced when the 
policy involves participation of the private sector in an area traditionally served by the public sector. 
It is evident that incumbent resistance influenced the policy making process. While the objective of 
the policy started with introduction of competition to bring efficiency gains, the objectives quickly 
expanded to protection of IR revenues, and to mitigate the effect of capacity constraints, resulting in 
entry barriers. As far as users were concerned, competition would have been the best remedy to 
protect their interests as the bargaining power of new entrants, given an active incumbent, would 
have been low. The policy making at an entry stage also did not factor in risks, which would be 
imposed on the private players if ambiguities and discretion of the public entities enhanced by a non 
level playing field could affect their use of investment and profitability.  
 
The policy process brings out the significance of the role of the non-IR stakeholders in dealing with 
incumbent resistance and the consequent entry barriers while ensuring a level playing field. Though 
there is recognition of the ambiguities and distortions, the issue may be far from being addressed. It 
would  be  essential  to  have  an  independent  regulator  on  issues  of  service  levels,  pricing,  non 
transparent collusion etc, primarily focused on the transactions between the IR and the operators.” 
 
[Morris et al, 2010 and Raghuram et al, 2010] 
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Exhibit 9: Umbrella SPVs for PPPs 
 
 
To facilitate project development and structuring and to make it amenable to private  participation, 
railways have created umbrella SPVs. 
 
1.  Container Corporation of India Ltd (CONCOR) (1988) 
 
CONCOR was incorporated in March 1988 under the Companies Act and commenced operation 
from November 1989 taking over the existing network of 7 ICDs from the IR. The prime objective 
was to provide efficient and reliable multi modal logistics support for the country’s export import 
and domestic trade. 
 
CONCOR is also a stakeholder in two container terminals at Indian ports. It holds 26% stake in 
Gateway Terminals India Pvt Ltd (GTIPL), a joint venture with Maersk, Denmark, for owning and 
managing the third container terminal at Jawaharlal Nehru Port. This terminal was awarded in August 
2004 through a competitive bidding. In February 2005, CONCOR picked up 15% stake in India 
Gateway Terminal Pvt Ltd, a joint venture with Dubai Ports International, to set up and operate an 
international container transshipment terminal at Vallarpadam, under the Cochin Port. 
 
2.  Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd (IRCTC) (2001) 
[http://www.irctc.co.in/RTI.htm] 
 
Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd (A Government of India Enterprise) was set 
up by the MoR with the basic purpose of hiving off entire catering and tourism activity of the 
railways to the new Corporation so as to professionalise and upgrade these services with public-
private participation. The mission of IRCTC is to "Enhance customer services and facilitation in 
railway catering, hospitality, travel and tourism with best industry practices”. IRCTC handles a wide 
range of Rail Passenger front end services such as Catering on Trains and at stations, production of 
Rail Neer bottled drinking water, Internet Ticketing, Railway Enquiry Call Centre-139, a complete 
range of Travel and Tourism related services including Rail based Tour Packages, Train Charters, 
Village and Wheels, Hotel Bookings, Cab Rental etc. 
 
3.  Partnerships with State Governments 
 
·  Government of Karnataka 
 
MoR  and  Government  of  Karnataka  have  created  a  SPV  namely,  Rail  Infrastructure 
Development Company of Karnataka (KRIDE) in 2002 with 26% equity each held by MoR and 
Karnataka  Government  and  48%  equity  by  Infrastructure  Development  Corporation  of 
Karnataka. This SPV was entrusted development of the following 4 projects: 
 
i. Solapur-Gadag: Gauge Conversion 
ii. Guntakal-Hospet Doubling 
iii. Hubli-Ankola: New Line 
iv. Hassan-Mangalore Gauge Conversion 
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·  Government of Tamilnadu 
 
The Government of Tamil Nadu shares two-thirds of the cost of Mass Rapid Transport System 
project between Thirumayilai and Vellacherry. It had contributed 50% of the cost of Salem - 
Cuddalore gauge conversion project and Chennai Beach - Tambaram – Chengleput suburban 
gauge conversion project. 
 
·  Government of Jharkhand 
 
An MOU was signed between the Government of Jharkhand and MoR in February 2002 for 
execution of six projects estimated at Rs 1997 cr. Two-thirds of the final completion cost will be 
borne  by  the  State  Government  and  one  third  by  the  MoR.  The  projects  include  Ranchi-
Hazaribagh-Koderma new line (189 kms), Ranchi-Lohardaga gauge conversion with extension to 
Tori  (113  kms),  Koderma-Giridih  new  line  (105  kms),  Deoghar-Dumka  new  line  (60  kms), 
Dumka-Rampurhat new line (64 kms) and Koderma-Tilaiya new line (20 kms). 
 
·  Government of West Bengal 
 
Government of West Bengal have agreed to share one-third of the cost of the extension of 
Metro Railway from Tolly Ganj to Garia.  
 
·  Government of Andhra Pradesh 
 
An MoU has been signed with the Government of AP for development of the Multimodal 
Urban Transport System in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secundrabad through JVs. Train 
services have been introduced. An SPV is proposed to be set up for managing the project. 
 
·  Government of Kerala  
 
IR has signed an MoU with the Kerala Government to form a JV for fabrication of bogie frames 
for passenger coaches and side walls for the wagons for IR. 
 
Railways  will  utilize  the  land  and  other  assets  of  SIKL,  a  public  sector  undertaking  of  the 
Government of Kerala, which has two units in Alleppey - Steel Fabrication Unit (SFU) and 
Autokast. IR will hold 51% stake in the JV and the remaining by the Kerala government. The JV 
will be set up in a phased manner. The Kerala government will have to clear all liabilities and 
obligations of state government as owner, promoter and guarantor of SFU and Autokast and 
transfer the assets to the JV along with employees.  
http://machinist.in/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1423&Itemid=2] 
 
·  In addition, there are MoUs with Government of Maharashtra for three projects, and Government of 
Haryana for one project.  
 
4.  Rail Vikas Nigam Limited (RVNL) (2003) 
[Jain, 2007; http://www.rvnl.org/annual_report/20100119031530_Annual_Report_RVNL_2008_09.pdf] 
 
MoR  has  created  another  SPV  in  the  name  of  Rail  Vikas  Nigam  Limited  in  2003  for  project 
development under PPP structure for implementing 55 projects identified under National Rail Vikas  
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Yojana.  These  Projects  pertain  to  strengthening  of  golden  quadrilateral  (29  projects),  port 
connectivity  and  corridors  to  hinterland  connectivity  (26  projects).  Salient  features  of  project 
development SPV are as under:  
 
•  Selection of sanctioned and viable projects 
•  The SPV will mobilise/raise financial resources, secure traffic guarantees, and select strategic 
partners in a project funding 
•  It can implement the projects by creation of project specific SPV or any other financing structure 
 
Operational Joint Venture SPVs of RVNL are: 
 
•  Kutch Railway Company Limited 
•  Haridaspur Paradip Railway Company Limited 
•  Krishnapatnam Railway Company Ltd 
•  Bharuch Dahej Railway Company Limited 
•  Angul Sukinda Railway Limited 
 
SPVs in the pipeline are: 
 
•  Surat Hazira Railway Company on Western Railway 
•  Dighi Port Railway Company on Konkan Railway 
•  Dholera Port Railway Company on Western Railway 
 
Upto 31st March 2009, SPVs had raised a total equity to the tune of Rs 635 cr which includes Rs 340 
cr equity from shareholders other than RVNL. 
 
5.  Rail Land Development Authority (RLDA) (2007) 
[http://www.rlda.in/] 
 
RLDA, setup in 2007, is a statutory Authority, under the MoR, set-up by an Amendment to the 
Railways  Act,  1989  (Amendment  No.  47  of  2005),  for  development  of  vacant  railway  land  for 
commercial use for the purpose of generating revenue by non-tariff measures.  
 
The Executive Board of RLDA consists of Member Engineering/IR Board as ex-officio Chairman, 
one Vice Chairman and four Members.  
 
IR (IR) has approximately 43,000 hectares of vacant land. Land which is not required for operational 
purposes in the foreseeable future would be identified by the zonal railways and the details thereof 
would be advised to Railway Board. Such plots of land would thereafter be entrusted to RLDA by 
Railway Board in phases for commercial development. 
 
Commercial development of vacant railway land by RLDA would generally involve the following 
steps: 
 
•  Inspection  of  the  sites  entrusted  by  MoR  to  ensure  that  these  are  free  from  any 
encumbrances/encroachments and are prima-facie suitable to commercial development. 
•  Getting a survey done for each individual plot of land from a reputed real estate consultant, to 
identify the use of the land which results in maximum revenue.  
   
 
 
IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
W.P.  No.  2010-08-02  Page No. 44 
•  Based on the commercial use decided, to call for an expression of interest/request for proposals 
from  developers  for  commercial  development  through  the  Public  Private  Partnership  (PPP) 
route, and 
•  Selecting a suitable developer based on laid down technical and financial parameters, after calling 
for financial bids from the short-listed developers. 
 
RLDA’s  expenses  are  met  out  of  grants  provided  by  IR.  The  entire  earnings  generated  from 
development of railway land would be transferred by RLDA to IR. 
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Exhibit 10: Policy on Luxury Tourist Trains 
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Exhibit 11: Attributes of Commercialization by the Railways 
 
 




















CONCOR  Low  High  High  High  Low  High  High  Low 
POW1  Low  High  High  Low  High  Low  *  Medium 
Sidings  Low  – 
Medium 
Low  High  – 
Medium 
Low  High  Low  *  Medium 
PRCL  Medium  *  Medium  *  High  Medium  High  Low 
KRC  High  Medium  Medium  High  Low  Low  *  Low 
OYWS  High  Low  Low  *  High  Low  *  Medium 
Catering  High  *  Low  *  High  High  *  High 
1Palace on Wheels; * Information available is not sufficient to comment upon 
 
[Raghuram, 2002]  
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Exhibit 12: Excerpts from the Railway Act 1989 on non-Government Railways 
 
 
2 (25).  "non-Government railway" means a railway other than a Government railway 
 
2 (32).  "railway administration", in relation to-- a non-Government railway, means the person who is the 
owner or lessee of the railway or the person working the railway under an agreement 
 
6.  Power  of  railway  administrations  to  execute  all  necessary  works.-Notwithstanding  anything 
contained in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of this Act 
and the provisions of any law for the acquisition of land for a public purpose or for companies, 
and  subject  also,  in  the  case  of  a  non-Government  railway,  to  the  provisions  of  any  contract 
between the non-Government railway and the Central Government, a railway administration may, 
for the purposes of constructing or maintaining a railway-- (a) make or construct in or upon, 
across, under or over any lands, or any streets, hills, valleys, roads, railway, tramways, or any 
rivers, canals, brooks, streams or other waters, or any drains, water-pipes, gas-pipes, oil-pipes, 
sewers, electric supply lines, or telegraph lines, such temporary or permanent inclined-planes, 
bridges, tunnels, culverts, embankments, adequcts, bridges, roads, lines of rail, ways, passages, 
conduits, drains, piers, cuttings and fences, in-take wells, tube wells, dams, river training and 
protection works as it thinks proper; 255 (b) alter the course of any rivers, brooks, streams or 
other water courses, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining tunnels, bridges, passages 
or other works over or under them and divert or alter either temporarily or permanently, the 
course of any rivers, brooks, streams or other water courses or any roads, streets or ways, or raise 
or sink the level thereof, in order to carry them more conveniently over or under or by the side 
of the railway; (c) make drains or conduits into, through or under any lands adjoining the railway 
for the purpose of conveying water from or to the railway; (d) erect and construct such houses, 
warehouses, offices and other buildings, and such yards, stations, wharves, engines, machinery 
apparatus and other works and conveniences as the railway administration thinks proper; (e) 
alter, repair or discontinue such buildings, works and conveniences as aforesaid or any of them 
and  substitute  others  in  their  stead;  (f)  erect,  operate,  maintain  or  repair  any  telegraph  and 
telephone lines in connection with the working of the railway; (g) erect, operate, maintain or 
repair any electric traction equipment, power supply and distribution installation in connection 
with the working of the railway; and (h) do all other acts necessary for making, maintaining, 
altering or repairing and using the railway. 
 
13.  Protection for Government property - Nothing in sections 11 and 12 shall authorise-- a railway 
administration of a non-Government railway to do anything on or to any works, lands or buildings 
vested in, or in the possession of, the Central Government or a State Government, without the 
consent of the Government concerned. 256 
 
169.  Levy of penalty on non-Government railway.- If a non-Government railway fails to comply with, any 
requisition made, decision or direction given, by the Central Government, under any of the 
provisions of this Act, or otherwise contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, it shall be 
open to the Central Government, by order, to levy a penalty not exceeding two hundred and 
fifty rupees and a further penalty not exceeding one hundred and fifty rupees for every day 
during which the contravention continues: Provided that no such penalty shall be levied except 
after giving a reasonable opportunity to the non-Government railway to make such representation 
as it deems fit. 304 
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170.  Recovery of penalty - Any penalty imposed by the Central Government under section 169, 
shall be recoverable by a suit in the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the 
head office of the non-Government railway is situated. 
 
171.  Section  169  or  170  not  to  preclude  Central  Government  from  taking  any  other  action.-
Nothing in section 169 or 170 shall preclude the Central Government from resorting to any 
other action to compel a non-Government railway to discharge any obligation imposed upon it by 
or under this Act. 
 
[http://www.icf.gov.in/rpf/linkpage/Railways%20Act%201989.pdf] 
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Exhibit 13: Excerpts from the Statement on Industrial Policy 1991 on Railways 
 
 
Proposed list of industries to be reserved for the Public Sector  
 
1.  Arms and ammunition and allied items of defence equipment, Defence aircraft and warships 
2.  Atomic Energy 
3.  Coal and lignite 
4.  Mineral oils 
5.  Mining if iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gypsum, sulphur, gold and diamond. 
6.  Mining of copper, lead, zinc, tin, molybdenum and wolfram. 
7.  Minerals specified in the Schedule to the Atomic Energy (Control of Production and Use) Order, 
1953 
8.  Railway transport 
 





•  Shock absorbers for railway equipment and 
•  Brake system for railway stock and locomotives. 
 
[http://siadipp.nic.in/publicat/nip0791.htm] 
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Glossary 
 
BOLT  Build Own Lease Transfer 
BOT  Build Operate and Transfer 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CIDCO  City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd 
CONCOR  Container Corporation of India Ltd 
CTO  Container Train Operator 
DDA  Delhi Development Authority 
HCW  High Capacity Wagons 
HMRDC  Hassan Mangalore Rail Development Company 
ICD  Inland container Depot 
IPO  Initial Public Offering 
IR  Indian Railways 
IRCTC  Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd 
IRFC  Indian Railway Finance Corporation 
JV  Joint Venture 
KRC  Konkan Railway Corporation Limited 
KRCL  Kutch Railway Corporation Limited 
KRIDE  Rail Infrastructure Development Company of Karnataka 
LWIS  Liberalized Wagon Investment Scheme 
MCD  Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
MD  Managing Director 
MMLP  Multi Modal Logistics Parks 
MoR  Ministry of Railways 
MRTS  Mass Rapid Transit System 
MRVC  Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation Ltd 
MSTDC  Maharashtra State Tourism Development Corporation 
NDMC  New Delhi Municipal Corporation 
OYWS  Own Your Wagon Scheme 
PC  Planning Commission 
PPP  Public Private Partnership 
PRCL  Pipavav Railway Corporation Limited 
RFP  Request for Proposal 
RFQ  Request for Quotation 
RLDA  Rail Land Development Authority 
RTDC  Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation 
RVNL  Rail Vikas Nigam Limited 
SPV  Special Purpose Vehicle 
SPW  Special Purpose Wagons 
TDS  Terminal Development Scheme 
WIS  Wagon Investment Scheme 
WLS  Wagon Leasing Scheme  
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